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INTRODUCTION
Originalism1 was born of a desire to constrain judges. Judicial constraint was
its heart and soul—its raison d’être. But however intriguing it might have been
to imagine a neutral theory that could purge the personal values of judges from
the process of constitutional adjudication, originalism initially suffered from so
many practical and theoretical defects that it failed even to be taken seriously,
let alone to prevail, in the legal academy.
So it has evolved. It has responded to its critics, refined itself, and matured. It
has indeed made such great theoretical strides as to win numerous adherents and
significant respect in the scholarly community.
The advocates of this new and improved originalism have self-consciously
adopted a new label—“the New Originalism”2—to distinguish their theory from
its failed forerunner—what this Article identifies as “the Old Originalism.” But
their theory is more distinct from its predecessor than many of them would like
to admit. Intentionally or not, the New Originalism has left behind more than
just the theoretical flaws of its predecessor. It has also effectively sacrificed the
Old Originalism’s promise of judicial constraint. The very changes that make
the New Originalism theoretically defensible also strip it of any pretense of a
power to constrain judges to a meaningful degree.
Randy Barnett, one of the most prominent New Originalists, may not be
excessively overstating the point when he claims that originalism “is now the
prevailing approach to constitutional interpretation.”3 But that is because, in its
New incarnation, originalism is no longer objectionable to liberals, libertarians,
and other believers in a robust judiciary enforcing an evolving and growing
body of constitutional rights and principles4—the very beliefs that the Old
1. Many constitutional theories can and do lay claim to the label of “originalism.” What those
theories generally have in common is that they treat “the discoverable meaning of the Constitution at
the time of its initial adoption as authoritative for purposes of constitutional interpretation in the
present.” Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599 (2004)
(defining the “basic theory” behind the variations of originalism).
2. This term appears to have been coined by Randy Barnett, see Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism
for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 620 (1999), and popularized by Keith Whittington, see
Whittington, supra note 1. One can, however, find scattered references to the term that predate Barnett.
See Evan S. Nadel, The Amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 on Appeal: Reconsidering Cooter
& Gell v. Hartmark Corporation, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 665, 691 n.191; Jeffrey Rosen, Introduction,
66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1081, 1081 (1998).
3. Barnett, supra note 2, at 613.
4. See id. at 623 (claiming that “originalism has been rendered safe enough to tempt even political
progressives to adopt it”); Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 353, 353–54 (2007) (referring to the views of Jack Balkin, another leading New Originalist,
as “lefty originalism”); Steven D. Smith, Reply to Koppelman: Originalism and the (Merely) Human
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Originalism was created to oppose.
That is to say, in its New form, originalism has sacrificed the feature that
once set it apart and gave it an identity and a mass appeal—the very thing that
made it what it is. Originalism has sold its soul to gain respect and adherents.5
And it can recover its soul only by abandoning the theoretical sophistication
that it needs in order to be taken seriously.
Although there is surely something of a “Monkey’s Paw” aspect to this—a
dose of irony in the insufferable price of a granted wish6—there is nothing
inherently illicit about the New Originalism. It would be unfair to saddle today’s
New Originalists with the unreasonable constraining fantasies of their forebears.
Indeed, some New Originalists explicitly part company from the Old Originalists by disavowing any serious claim to judicial constraint. Still, many other
New Originalists continue to spin rhetoric about judicial constraint—making
promises that their theory manifestly cannot keep. In addition, numerous selfprofessed originalists do not place themselves squarely in either the New or the
Old camp. Instead, they muddle about with a foot in each camp, trying to have
their cake and eat it too. They claim sophistication by drawing upon the
theoretical advances of the New Originalism, while simultaneously claiming the
mantle of constraint by drawing upon the rhetoric of the Old Originalism, all the
while failing to recognize that these claims are mutually exclusive.
The purpose of this Article is to illuminate this fundamental truth, which has
seemingly escaped the notice of many originalists currently basking in the glow
of unprecedented success in the courts and the law reviews: Originalism has
achieved its intellectual respectability only at the necessary expense of its
ballyhooed promise of constraint. Part I recounts the theoretical advances of the
New Originalism. Part II argues that, as a result of these advances, the New
Originalism is substantially more defensible than was the Old one and is much
better positioned to answer the scholarly critiques that demolished its predecessor. Part III explains that these benefits have, however, come at the cost of
judicial constraint. By its very nature—and to a far greater degree than its
proponents have tended to recognize—the New Originalism is a theory that
affords massive discretion to judges in resolving contentious constitutional
issues. Part IV seeks to clear up some confusion on these points that might stem

Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 189, 189 (2010) (arguing that Jack Balkin’s originalism “is able to
justify pretty much any results that the most ardently progressive constitutional heart could desire”).
5. See Steven D. Smith, That Old-Time Originalism 11 (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law Legal
Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 08-028, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract⫽1150447 (“[I]n gaining Balkin and like-minded thinkers, originalism loses . . . well, its soul.”);
cf. Reva B. Siegel, Heller & Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and Practice, 56 UCLA L. REV.
1399, 1412 (2009) (arguing that New Originalist theories, which she calls “[s]econd-generation
originalist theories,” “lose many of their distinctive methodological constraints as originalist theories of
constitutional interpretation” (emphasis added)) .
6. See generally W.W. JACOBS, The Monkey’s Paw, in THE LADY OF THE BARGE AND OTHERS, ENTIRE
COLLECTION 14 (The Echo Library 2009) (1902) (a classic horror short story in which the paw of a dead
monkey grants its owner three wishes, but at a great price for interfering with fate).
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from an unfamiliarity with the jargon of the New Originalism, and Part V
examines some of the ways in which originalists have sought, unsuccessfully, to
avoid the consequences of the evolution of their theory.
The Article concludes by suggesting that there is something unsustainable in
the current state of affairs. Originalism gains it salience in the public discourse
by its continued reliance on a promise to constrain judges; it is that promise that
brings it lay respect. Yet, it gains academic respect only by foregoing that
promise. Originalism now garners esteem from much of both the public and the
academy, but only because the public and the academy are speaking of very
different things when they refer to originalism. Originalism somehow continues
to thrive as both a political movement and as a scholarly theory, even though the
features that make it attractive as a political movement render it impotent as a
scholarly theory and vice versa.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW ORIGINALISM
Originalism, as a distinct theory of constitutional interpretation, arose as a
by-product of the conservative frustration with the broad, rights-expansive
decisions of the Warren and Burger Courts.7 Richard Nixon based much of his
campaign for the presidency on an attack on the liberal Warren Court and an
insistence that it was “‘the job of the courts to interpret the law, not to make the
law.’”8 In appointing Justice Rehnquist to the bench, Nixon promised that his
new Justice would “‘interpret the Constitution, . . . not twist or bend the Constitution in order to perpetuate his personal political and social views.’”9 Rehnquist explained at his confirmation hearings that he would accomplish this feat
by refusing “to disregard the intent of the [F]ramers of the Constitution and
change it to achieve a result that [he] thought might be desirable for society.”10
These were the beginnings of the Old Originalism, and the themes that
Rehnquist sounded were typical of its early scholarly defenders.11 Old Original-

7. See John Harrison, Forms of Originalism and the Study of History, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 83,
83–86 (2003); Whittington, supra note 1, at 599–601 (arguing that “originalism was a reactive theory
motivated by substantive disagreement with the recent and then-current actions of the Warren and
Burger Courts”); cf. Larry Kramer, Two (More) Problems with Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
907, 908 (2008) (“The idea of originalism as an exclusive theory, as the criterion for measuring
constitutional decisions, emerged only in the 1970s and 1980s.”). See generally JOHNATHAN O’NEILL,
ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 94–110 (2005) (explaining the
rise of originalism as, among other things, a product of a growing conservative political movement and
a rejection of Warren Court decisions).
8. O’NEILL, supra note 7, at 96 (quoting President Nixon).
9. President Richard Nixon, Address to the Nation Announcing Intention To Nominate Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., and William H. Rehnquist To Be Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United
States (Oct. 21, 1971), in 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RICHARD NIXON,
1971, at 1054 (1972).
10. Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 19 (1971) (question from Sen. John L. McClellan to William H. Rehnquist).
11. See Whittington, supra note 1, at 602 (noting that the “primary commitment” of the Old
Originalism “was to judicial restraint” and that “[o]riginalist methods of constitutional interpretation
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ists insisted that their theory, by employing an objective historical criterion that
is “exterior to the will of the Justices,”12 would limit the ability of judges to
read their own personal policy preferences into the Constitution.13 As Raoul
Berger put it: “If the Court may substitute its own meaning for that of the
Framers it may . . . rewrite the Constitution without limit.”14 If, however, the
Court is bound by the original intent of the Framers—if it “adhere[s] to the
principles actually laid down in the historic Constitution”15—then it will no
longer be able to issue Warren Court-style decisions that are based more on the
Justices’ personal conceptions of the good than on the actual meaning of the
Constitution.16 In Lillian BeVier’s words: “The criteria of originalism constrain
all the participants in the game—including, most especially, the referees.”17
In this respect, originalism offered the promise of a truly distinct theory of
constitutional interpretation—one that could constrain judges, respect democracy, and preserve the rule of law.18 It would be difficult to overstate the extent
to which the Old Originalism was characterized by its own proponents as a
theory that could constrain judges and preclude them from reading their own
policy preferences—most importantly, their own preferred unenumerated rights—
into the Constitution.19
were understood as a means to that end”—as a “mechanism to redirect judges from essentially
subjective consideration of morality to objective consideration of legal meaning”); cf. O’NEILL, supra
note 7, at 145–46, 154–55, 157 (explaining that the Old Originalism was conceived as a way to limit
personal judgments by the Judiciary and to favor majoritarian decision making).
12. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 6
(1971).
13. See, e.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ORIGINAL MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A
SOURCEBOOK 2–3 (1987) [hereinafter OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY].
14. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
408 (Liberty Fund, 2d ed. 1997) (1977).
15. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 163 (1990);
see also Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
823, 826 (1986) (“The only way in which the Constitution can constrain judges is if the judges interpret
the document’s words according to the intentions of those who drafted, proposed, and ratified its
provision and its various amendments.”).
16. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 14, at 308–11 (“The Justices’ value choices may not displace those
of the Framers.”); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 695
(1976) (arguing that judges should not “address themselves to a social problem simply because other
branches of government have failed or refused to do so” and should not substitute “some other set of
values for those which may be derived from the language and intent of the [F]ramers”).
17. Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and Impersonality of Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
283, 291 (1996).
18. See Thomas B. Colby, The Federal Marriage Amendment and the False Promise of Originalism,
108 COLUM. L. REV. 529, 530 (2008) (“In asserting the existence of an objective, discoverable, fixed
constitutional meaning capable of directing judicial decisionmaking in a value-neutral manner, originalism made an enticing promise—a way to ensure that judges do not subvert democracy and the rule of
law by reading their personal values into the Constitution.”).
19. See generally O’NEILL, supra note 7, passim (detailing the rise of the originalist movement).
Lino Graglia, for instance, argued that it would be “impossible” to “show that [nonoriginalist]
constitutional law is something other than a means of substituting the liberal policy preferences of a
cultural elite for the policy preferences of a majority of the American people.” Lino A. Graglia,
Constitutional Interpretation, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 631, 640 (1993).
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This was an enticing promise. In the words of Earl Maltz, one of the leading
Old Originalists, it was “this potential for neutrality that account[ed] for the
visceral appeal of originalism.”20 The American people—especially political
conservatives, who were enraged by the progressive decisions of the Warren
Court—were intrigued. Originalism thus gained significant respect within the
American political conservative movement.21 But if it was going to gain
academic respect—respect among constitutional theorists—it would have to be
able to stand up to the rigors of critical scrutiny. It would have to prove itself as
a workable, coherent, and intellectually sound theory of constitutional interpretation.
The Old Originalism could not do that. Those outside of the movement
buried it in a sea of devastating critiques—critiques that it could not withstand,
at least not without substantially reformulating itself in order to deflect them.
And at the same time, those within the movement began to recognize, and shore
up, some of its flaws. Thus, over the course of the last two decades, originalism
has evolved. The Old Originalism has all but withered away.22 In its place, a
New Originalism has sprouted up, taken root, and thrived.23
It would be a mistake to view either the Old or the New Originalism as a
distinct and coherent constitutional theory; “originalism” is a label that has
been, and continues to be, affixed to a remarkably diverse array of interpretive
theories that in fact share surprisingly little in common.24 But it is fair to say
that there has been an unmistakable direction in the general flow of the
20. Earl Maltz, Foreword: The Appeal of Originalism, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 773, 794; see also
Lawrence Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have an Original Meaning? On Originalism, Due Process,
Procedural Innovation . . . and Parking Tickets, 60 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2007) (“[O]riginalism is said to
tame the monster of judicial activism by teaching that a conscientious inquiry into historical sources
will yield the original meaning of constitutional text and thereby provide a reliable and objective basis
for constitutional adjudication.”); Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral Convictions into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1525 (1989) (book review) (“The appeal of
originalism is that the moral principles so applied will be the foundational principles of the American
Republic . . . and not the political-moral principles of whomever happens to occupy the judicial
office.”).
21. See Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living
Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 549 (2006).
22. See Whittington, supra note 1, at 603–07. But see Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism
passim (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research Paper No.
08-067, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract⫽1235722 (defending the Old Originalism); Walter
Benn Michaels, A Defense of Old Originalism, 31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 21 passim (2009) (same);
Smith, supra note 5, at 15 (tepidly opposing the transition from the Old Originalism to the New
Originalism); cf. Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Public Meaning in Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 704 (2009) (defending a version of originalism that resembles the Old
Originalism in many respects).
23. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 620–29; Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1185, 1188–91; Whittington, supra note 1, at 607–12.
24. Peter Smith and I have explained elsewhere that the evolution of originalist thought has not been
characterized by a tidy, steady, linear flow. At any given moment, there are numerous mutually
exclusive theories of constitutional interpretation that all claim the mantle of “originalism,” and the
discord in originalist thought is only increasing over time. See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith,
Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 258 (2009).
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mainstream of originalist thought. In rejecting the Old Originalism and developing the New one, originalists have, by and large, made a series of significant
theoretical moves that have brought them to a very different place from where
they started. These moves have not been neatly sequential; different thinkers
have embraced different moves at different times, and the various moves have
often occurred simultaneously, each drawing upon the rationales driving the
others.25 Virtually every originalist has embraced at least some of these moves,
yet only a few have explicitly embraced all of them.26 As such, there is no
magic line of demarcation between the New and Old Originalism.27 There has,
instead, been a gradual and ongoing—but clearly substantial—change of focus.
Thus, although something called “originalism” has recently gained unprecedented acceptance in the academy, the particular originalism of the 1970s and
early 1980s is not now (nor was it ever) especially influential in academic
circles.28 It is the New Originalism that has won over converts in the scholarly
community.
The remainder of this Part sets out the theoretical moves from the Old to the
New Originalism: (a) the move from original intent to original meaning; (b) the
move from subjective meaning to objective meaning; (c) the move from actual
25. Indeed, many of these steps are so closely related that it may be difficult conceptually to separate
them. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 662 (2009) (suggesting that the
distinction between original meaning and original expected application is “a question of the level of
generality”).
26. See Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It Sounds,
22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 260 (2005) (noting that much originalist scholarship “straddles the line”
between the New and the Old versions); Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive
Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1142 & n.99 (2003) (discussing
the work of Steven Calabresi and Saikrishna Prakash, who can be somewhat “imprecise” in describing
the proper object of the originalist inquiry).
27. See Colby, supra note 18, at 573 (noting that differing originalisms are not “distinct schools of
thought as much as they are . . . ranges on the continuum of originalist theory; they often bleed together,
and many originalists have at times made statements consistent with more than one of them”).
Commentators often articulate the line between the New and Old Originalisms as the transition from a
theory of original intent to a theory of original meaning. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, District of
Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 933 (2009). On this view, Justice
Scalia—a great champion of original meaning rather than original intent, see infra note 38 and
accompanying text—falls on the New Originalist side of the line. See Solum, supra. Other commentators, however, have noted that Justice Scalia has not in practice embraced other moves discussed below,
and thus, they do not group Justice Scalia among the New Originalists. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 25,
at 672 n.77 (differentiating Justice Scalia’s views from those of Keith Whittington and Randy Barnett).
Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes Paulsen place Justice Scalia in the New Originalist camp, but
recognize that his version of New Originalism is a less refined one that remains closer to the Old
Originalism than do the theories of the leaders of the New Originalist movement. See Kesavan &
Paulsen, supra note 26, at 1140 (“But even though Justice Scalia remains the dominant figure in the
shift to originalist textualism, his is not always the most refined or consistent version of the theory. In
some ways, he is a leader whose followers have bettered the leader’s own work. Scholars and judges a
half-generation younger than Scalia, who are in some respects his heirs, often appear to be employing
more thoroughly and carefully honed versions of originalist textualism.”); see also id. at 1141 n.96
(arguing that Judge Bork, in his later writings, moved away from the Old Originalism and most of the
way to the New Originalism).
28. See Greene, supra note 25, at 662 & n.22, 670–71; infra notes 137–40 and accompanying text.
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to hypothetical understanding; (d) the embrace of standards and general principles; (e) the embrace of broad levels of generality; (f) the move from original
expected application to original objective principles; (g) the distinction between
interpretation and construction; and (h) the distinction between normative and
semantic originalism. Individually, each of these moves has, for the most part,
been sensible; each deserves praise for responding to powerful criticisms and
substantially improving the underlying theory. But collectively, they have had
an ironic effect when examined against the backdrop of the animating promise
of the early originalist movement.
A. FROM ORIGINAL INTENT TO ORIGINAL MEANING

The Old Originalism entailed a commitment to the original intent of the
Framers. That is to say, in its early days, originalism was understood as a
mandate to interpret the Constitution to mean what the Framers intended it
mean: “judges should be guided by the intent of the Framers of the relevant
constitutional provisions.”29 Edwin Meese, for instance, insisted upon a “jurisprudence of original intention” that focused on “the original intent of the Framers.”30 Raoul Berger decreed that the “‘original intention’ of the Framers . . . is
binding on the Court.”31 Judge Robert Bork declared that “original intent is the
only legitimate basis for constitutional decisionmaking.”32 And Justice Rehnquist demanded judicial allegiance to the “language and intent” of the Framers.33
That focus, however, lent itself to devastating criticism. Among other stinging rebukes, critics charged that it is often impossible to uncover a single
collective “intent” of “the [F]ramers” as a whole, insofar as different Framers
were often motivated by different intentions.34 Critics also argued that original
intent is a self-defeating philosophy. The historical evidence shows that the
Framers intended for future generations not to interpret the Constitution according to the intent of the Framers; as such, in order to follow the intent of the
Framers, one must not follow the intent of the Framers.35
In the face of these withering critiques, originalists began a “campaign to
29. Earl Maltz, Some New Thoughts on an Old Problem—The Role of the Intent of the Framers in
Constitutional Theory, 63 B.U. L. REV. 811, 811–12 (1983).
30. Edwin Meese III, Att’y Gen. of the United States, Address Before the DC Chapter of the
Federalist Society Lawyers Division (Nov. 15, 1985), in OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 13, at 91,
96–97.
31. BERGER, supra note 14, at 3.
32. Bork, supra note 15, at 823.
33. See Rehnquist, supra note 16, at 695, 697–98.
34. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV.
204, 209–22 (1980). For an Old Originalist response to this objection, see Richard S. Kay, Adherence to
the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L.
REV. 226, 248–51 (1988).
35. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885,
885–88 (1985). For Old Originalist responses, see Kay, supra note 34, at 273–81, and Charles A.
Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 77, 77–79 (1988). For a
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change the label from the Doctrine of Original Intent to the Doctrine of Original
Meaning,”36 thus shifting the focus of their theory from a search for the original
intent of the Framers to a search for the original meaning of the Constitution.37
As Justice Scalia explained it, originalists began to seek “the original meaning
of the text, not what the original draftsmen intended.”38
This change in focus was a significant theoretical advancement. It instantly
shored up the theory of originalism against the most powerful objections by
ostensibly avoid[ing] both the problem of determining the collective intent of
the numerous Framers (the Framers may have had many reasons for enacting
it, but the text nonetheless had only one meaning) and the problem of
self-defeat (much of the historical evidence that was mustered to undermine
the reliance on original intent actually supports the reliance on original
meaning by suggesting that the Framers believed that the original meaning of
the text, rather than the original intent of the drafters, would control future
constitutional interpretation).39

It also avoided the concern that the intent of the Framers might have been
idiosyncratic and unknowable to the people in whose name the Constitution was
adopted. Justice Scalia has explained that a focus on original intent can be seen
as inconsistent with the rule of law—even worse than Nero’s practice of
“posting edicts [so] high up on the pillars that they could not . . . easily be read
by the people.”40 “Government by unexpressed intent is similarly tyrannical. It
is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.”41 This concern was
mitigated by focusing on the original meaning of the publicly known law, rather
than the private intentions of the lawgivers.
Originalism was changing; it was responding to its critics and purging its
flaws by becoming more theoretically sophisticated.

more recent challenge to Powell’s historical evidence, see Robert G. Natelson, The Founders’ Hermeneutic: The Real Original Understanding of Original Intentions, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1239, 1245–46 (2007).
36. Justice Antonin Scalia, Address Before the Attorney General’s Conference on Economic Liberties in Washington, D.C. (June 14, 1986), in OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 13, at 101, 106.
37. For a discussion of this move in originalist thought, see Barnett, supra note 2, at 620–29,
Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 26, at 1134–48, Rosenthal, supra note 20, at 3–11, and Whittington,
supra note 1, at 603–07.
38. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 3, 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); see also BORK, supra note 15, at 144 (“The search is not for a
subjective intention. If someone found a letter from George Washington to Martha telling her that what
he meant by the power to lay taxes was not what other people meant, that would not change our reading
of the Constitution in the slightest. Nor would the subjective intentions of all the members of a ratifying
convention alter anything. When lawmakers use words, the law that results is what those words
ordinarily mean.”).
39. Colby, supra note 18, at 531 (footnote omitted).
40. Scalia, supra note 38, at 17.
41. Id.
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B. FROM SUBJECTIVE MEANING TO OBJECTIVE MEANING

The move from original intent to original meaning was a sound step, but it
was initially an undertheorized one. What, exactly, did “original meaning”
mean? To many originalists, it meant the “original understanding” of the
Constitution’s meaning.42 But whose understanding? Many originalists sought
the meaning that the Framers originally understood the Constitution to have.43
Most originalists, however, came to view the original meaning as the meaning
that the public originally understood the Constitution to have. As Keith Whittington explains, this approach was grounded in the belief that, “[i]n ratifying the
document, the people appropriated it, giving its text the meaning that was
publicly understood.”44 Thus, many originalists began to articulate the interpretive task as a search for the “public understanding” of the meaning of the
Constitution.45 On this view, constitutional interpretation entails ascertaining
“what the original language actually meant to those who used the terms in
question”46—that is, the “meaning of the provision to the public on whose
behalf it was ratified.”47
This approach helped to ameliorate the concerns about the illegitimacy of
government by unexpressed intent; on this theory, the public was bound only by
the meaning that was actually collectively understood by the people. Yet this
approach failed to ameliorate other concerns with the Old Originalism. The
move from original intent to original meaning had been premised in substantial
part on a desire to avoid subjective interpretation. But defining “original meaning” as “original understanding” did not avoid the subjectivity problem; it
simply replaced one subjective inquiry (the intent of the Framers) with another

42. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 506 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(equating original meaning with original understanding); Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 491 (2002)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same).
43. There was disagreement about whether the relevant Framers were those who drafted the
Constitution, or those who ratified it. Compare Earl M. Maltz, Personal Jurisdiction and Constitutional
Theory—A Comment on Burnham v. Superior Court, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 689, 696 (1991) (arguing that
originalism “focuses on the original understanding of those who drafted the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment”), with Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 26, at 1137 (“The shift to original understanding was part
of an increased recognition that it was the . . . Constitution’s Ratifiers . . . whose actions gave legal life
to the otherwise dead words on paper drafted by the Philadelphia Convention . . . .”), and Lofgren,
supra note 35 (arguing that the originalist inquiry should seek the understanding of the ratifiers).
44. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 60 (1999).
45. E.g., Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 331,
339 (2004).
46. Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial Activism: A Reply to
Professor Randy Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1081 (2005) (book review).
47. Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional Interpretation, 77
VA. L. REV. 669, 675 (1991); see also, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of
the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. Rev. 1127, 1136 (1998) (“Originalism is the idea that the words of the
Constitution must be understood as they were understood by the ratifying public at the time of
enactment.”).
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one (the understanding of the Framers or of the public).48 The inquiry was still
focused on the subjective beliefs of particular persons. And the search for
subjective beliefs is fraught with peril, especially when the quest is to determine
the subjective understandings of the populace as a whole. What if the public did
not share a single understanding? That is to say, what if different people
understood the text to mean different things? At that point, the inquiry into
original understanding will fail for precisely the same reasons that the inquiry
into original intent will fail.49
To make matters worse, critics charged that—just as with original intent—it
is often impossible to determine the actual original understanding of a particular
constitutional provision (even if we are willing to imagine that a single understanding in fact existed) because the historical record is contradictory,50 incomplete,51 or severely compromised.52
The move from original intent to original meaning, on its own, did nothing to
obviate these concerns. Indeed, in some ways it merely exacerbated them by
expanding the number of persons whose views and understandings were relevant.53 Thus, over time, the focus of the originalist inquiry began to evolve
again. Originalists began to speak of the “original meaning” project in more

48. See Tara Smith, Why Originalism Won’t Die—Common Mistakes in Competing Theories of
Judicial Interpretation, 2 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 159, 201–02 (2007).
49. See Colby, supra note 18, at 596 (“When it came to controversial subjects, the constitutional
language that emerged from the drafting process was generally capable of supporting more than one
meaning, and the people were able to ratify it only because they did not agree on which of its possible
meanings was correct.”); Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 26, at 1138 (noting that a search for “the
actual understanding of the Ratifiers” does not avoid “all the problems of use of legislative history and
ascertaining collective intention”).
50. See Suzanna Sherry, The Indeterminacy of Historical Evidence, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 437,
440 (1996) (explaining that “careful historical analysis of the same evidence may yield opposite
conclusions” with respect to the Framers’ original intent); Peter J. Smith, The Sources of Federalism:
An Empirical Analysis of the Court’s Quest for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217, 281–83
(2004) (“It should come as no surprise, then, that well-meaning originalist judges can use the historical
record to substantiate sharply conflicting views of the original understanding.”).
51. See, e.g., Mitchell Gordon, Adjusting the Rear-View Mirror: Rethinking the Use of History in
Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 475, 477 & n.8 (2006) (citing sources arguing “that
the historical record is too incomplete or inconclusive for modern-day readers to pinpoint the Framers’
original meaning”).
52. The records of many of the key proceedings in the drafting and ratification of the original
Constitution and the Bill of Rights were negligently recorded and selectively edited by partisans. See,
e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085,
1088–89 (1989); James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the Documentary
Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 12–24, 36 (1986).
53. See Kramer, supra note 7, at 910 (“The indeterminacy argument became stronger, because
indeterminacy of intent was magnified by the expansion of the number of individuals whose intent was
to be considered. It was not now a small group of fifty-five in Philadelphia whose intent was to be
considered, but rather a vast body including every individual who voted on the Constitution. Originalists found themselves trying to recover the understanding of an exceedingly large group of people . . . .”
(footnote omitted)).
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objective terms: as a search for the original, objective meaning of the text,54
thereby ostensibly evading the various subjectivity-based objections.
C. FROM ACTUAL TO HYPOTHETICAL UNDERSTANDING

As originalists developed this notion of a genuinely objective inquiry, they
gradually became more sophisticated—and more aggressive—in how they articulated it. They explicitly disavowed not only original intent, but also original
understanding.55 Rejecting any effort to determine how the words of the Constitution were actually understood by the Framers or the public, they refocused the
inquiry into an effort to determine how a hypothetical, reasonable person would
have understood the words of the Constitution. The “search for original meaning” was no longer “a search for historically concrete understandings.”56 It
became instead “a hypothetical inquiry that asks how a fully informed public
audience, knowing all that there is to know about the Constitution and the
surrounding world, would understand a particular provision.”57 In essence, it
became a reasonable person test: the hypothetical understandings of the “reasonable American person of 1788.”58
Here again, originalism was becoming more refined and more sophisticated.
This move simultaneously deflected concerns about both historical indeterminacy and collective disagreement. That there was no actual agreement on the
meaning of constitutional language—at least not one that can be reconstructed
by reference to the sketchy historical record—was no longer necessarily fatal to
the theory.
D. EMBRACING STANDARDS AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES

The Old Originalism, with its core commitment to judicial restraint, generally
held on faith that the Constitution does not contain open-ended provisions

54. See, e.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 13, at 14–16, 20; Barnett, supra note 2, at 621;
Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 105 (2001);
Scalia, supra note 38.
55. See Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 26, at 1132 (“It is not a theory of anyone’s intent or
intention. Nor is it a theory of anyone-in-particular’s understanding. Nor is it a theory of the collective
intention of a particular body of people, or of a society as a whole.”).
56. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, 77 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1, 25 (2001).
57. Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 398 (2002); see also
Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 26, at 1132 (explaining that the proper inquiry is how the words of the
Constitution “would have been understood by a hypothetical, objective, reasonably well-informed
reader of those words and phrases, in context, at the time they were adopted, and within the political
and linguistic community in which they were adopted”). Michael Perry reaches essentially the same
conclusion when he defends a version of original meaning that asks “how the provision was understood
by the People, or would have been understood by them had they been paying attention and had they
achieved access to all the relevant information.” Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and the
Question of Minimalism, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 84, 89 (1993).
58. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 48
(2006); see id. at 70–73 (describing this inquiry).
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affording significant discretion to the judges who interpret them. Thus, Raoul
Berger included an entire chapter in his enormously influential book, Government by Judiciary, rejecting what he called the “‘Open-Ended’ Phraseology
Theory” of constitutional interpretation.59 And Judge Bork famously analogized
both the Ninth Amendment60 and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment61 to “ink blot[s]” on the Constitution, rejecting their
seemingly capacious language on the ground that it is impossible to believe that
the Framers intended to allow unelected judges to enforce rights not explicitly
enumerated in the Constitution.62
But this reasoning makes little sense once the originalist inquiry is directed
away from a search for actual historical intentions. If the proper interpretive
quest is, instead, for the objective meaning that a hypothetical reasonable
observer would find in the text, then the actual or imagined reluctance on the
part of the Framers to vest the Judiciary with interpretive discretion becomes
less relevant. What matters is whether the text would, at the time, have been
naturally read to contain open-ended standards.
Originalists soon came to realize that many provisions surely would have.
The American Constitution is among the shortest in the world63 and is “exceptional [not only] in how few enumerated rights it contains,” but also in that
those rights are “by comparative standards exceptionally vague[ ] ones.”64
Stephen Gardbaum explains that “[a]lmost all other constitutions contain longer
lists of more particular liberties and an equality provision setting out prohibited
bases of discrimination.”65 Our Constitution, by contrast—with its short list of
lofty guarantees like “equal protection of the laws,”66 “freedom of speech,”67
and “due process of law”68—is objectively open-ended in many instances.
Many New Originalists have found this conclusion inescapable. Randy Barnett,
for instance, has concluded that “the Constitution includes . . . open-ended or
abstract provisions, and thereby delegates discretion to judges.”69 To deny that
59. See BERGER, supra note 14, at 116–31; see also O’NEILL, supra note 7, at 124–25 (noting that
Berger did not allow for a broad or vague original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”).
61. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1, cl. 2 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”).
62. See BORK, supra note 15, at 166, 180–85; O’NEILL, supra note 7, at 139 (noting that Bork
rejected any interpretation of these clauses as open-ended and enforceable by judges). Justice Scalia has
echoed that the Ninth Amendment’s vague guarantee of “other rights” should not be enforced by
judges. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91–92 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
63. See Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and Reality of American Constitutional Exceptionalism, 107
MICH. L. REV. 391, 399 (2008).
64. Id. at 399–400.
65. Id. at 400 (footnote omitted).
66. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
67. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
68. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V.
69. Barnett, supra note 26, at 264; see also Barnett, supra note 2, at 623 (noting that the New
Originalism has moved “from relatively specific rule-like commands to more abstract principle-like

726

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 99:713

discretion, Barnett argues, is in fact to defy the original meaning of the Constitution.70 Jack Balkin has recently concurred, explaining that if we truly want to be
“faithful to original meaning,” then we must enforce the text as written: “If the
text states a determinate rule, we must apply the rule in today’s circumstances.
If it states a standard, we must apply the standard. And if it states a general
principle, we must apply the principle.”71
E. EMBRACING BROADER LEVELS OF GENERALITY

The revelation that constitutional provisions are not always entirely rule-like
led to a related advancement in originalist thought—one involving the proper
level of generality at which to articulate and to apply the governing principle,
standard, or general rule. The Old Originalism viewed this task through the lens
of curtailing judicial discretion, and thus favored narrower levels of generality.72 But critics charged that this approach was not genuinely originalist—that
it looked not to history, but rather to political theory, to choose the proper level
of generality.73 In this regard, it was no less subjective and infiltrated with the
personal politics of the judge than were the approaches from which originalists
sought to distinguish themselves.
In a responsive effort to make the inquiry more objective and historical,
originalists began to view the proper level of generality as a part of the original
meaning of the provision itself. Judge Bork came to the view that the “role of a
judge committed to the philosophy of original understanding is not to ‘choose a
level of abstraction.’ Rather, it is to find the meaning of a text—a process which
includes finding its degree of generality, which is part of its meaning . . . .”74
injunctions”); Whittington, supra note 1, at 610 (“It is entirely possible for a text to embody principles
or general rules, and much of the constitutional text does exactly that.”).
70. See Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN.
L. REV. 7, 11–13 (2006); cf. Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s
Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 663, 673 (2009) (“It is not an adequate answer in these situations to
say, as Justice Scalia sometimes does, that originalist judges ought not to enforce Clauses of this kind
because they do not lend themselves to principled judicial application.”).
71. Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549,
553 (2009).
72. See Raoul Berger, Some Reflections on Interpretivism, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1986)
(agreeing with Judge Bork that original intent does not permit judges to use high levels of abstraction);
Farber, supra note 52, at 1094–95 (discussing Bork, supra note 15, at 828); cf. O’NEILL, supra note 7, at
127 (noting that Raoul Berger “insisted that general terms in the text could not overcome clear extrinsic
evidence that the [F]ramers intended the terms to have limited meaning”).
73. See Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1091–92 (1981) (“The fact is that all adjudication
requires making choices among the levels of generality on which to articulate principles, and all such
choices are inherently non-neutral.”); Farber, supra note 52, at 1095; see also RONALD DWORKIN,
FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 268–71, 298–300 (1996) (criticizing Judge Bork for failing to articulate a principled method for choosing the proper level of generality);
cf. Richard A. Posner, What Am I? A Potted Plant?, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 28, 1987, at 23, 24–25 (“The
Constitution does not say, ‘Read me broadly,’ or, ‘Read me narrowly.’ That decision must be made as a
matter of political theory . . . .”).
74. BORK, supra note 15, at 149.
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Subsequently, Michael McConnell articulated the inquiry in terms of original
understanding—as the quest for “the level of generality at which the particular
language was understood by its Framers.”75 This necessitated a further recognition on McConnell’s part that it “is perfectly possible that, upon dispassionate
historical investigation, the interpreter would discover that some provisions of
the Constitution were understood at a high level of generality.”76
More recently, those New Originalists who have explicitly disavowed the
focus on actual, subjective intent or understanding, and who have refocused the
inquiry in objective terms, have come to see the level of generality inquiry as a
largely textualist one.77 Jack Balkin, for instance, has rejected the “old and
familiar debate about the level of generality at which we should construe the
[F]ramers’ and ratifiers’ purposes” as “beholden to the theory of original
intention or original understanding.”78 Balkin argues that “if what matters to us
is the original meaning of the text, then the principles underlying the constitutional text should be as general as the text itself.”79 The inquiry is still a
historical one, but one that is designed to uncover the level of generality at
which the constitutional terms would have been objectively understood by
reasonable observers at the time of the framing.80 And this inquiry, many New
Originalists have determined, may yield the conclusion that “the original meaning is rather abstract, or at a higher level of generality.”81 In such cases—“when
the text uses relatively abstract and general concepts”—a judge “must look to
the principles that underlie the text to make sense of and apply [them].”82 And
“[b]ecause the text points to general and abstract concepts, these underlying
principles will usually also be general and abstract.”83

75. Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald
Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1280 (1997).
76. Id. at 1281; see also WHITTINGTON, supra note 44, at 187 (explaining that “originalists would be
equally misguided in simply dismissing the possibility that the founders intended to constitutionalize
broader concepts”); Whittington, supra note 1, at 611 (“[I]t is entirely possible that the principles that
the founders meant to embody in the text were fairly abstract.”).
77. See Barnett, supra note 70, at 23 (“[O]riginal public meaning originalism attempts to identify the
level of generality in which the Constitution is objectively expressed.”).
78. Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427,
488 (2007).
79. Id.
80. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 644–45; Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 349, 359 (1992) (explaining that for Judge Bork “the question [is] the level of generality
the ratifiers and other sophisticated political actors at the time would have imputed to the text”).
81. Barnett, supra note 26, at 263; see also Balkin, supra note 78, at 494 (arguing that the
Fourteenth Amendment is expressed at a high level of generality).
82. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 304–05 (2007).
83. Id. at 305; see also Balkin, supra note 78, at 493–94 (“The principles underlying the text should
be at roughly the same level of generality as the text . . . . [For example,] the [F]ramers of the
Fourteenth Amendment used the very general language of ‘equal protection of the laws’ and ‘privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States.’ Any underlying principles we associate with those texts
must be as general as the words themselves.”).
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F. FROM ORIGINAL EXPECTED APPLICATION TO ORIGINAL OBJECTIVE PRINCIPLES

This move from the actual, subjective, and narrow to the hypothetical,
objective, and abstract brought along with it (at least for most originalists) a
profound change in the way in which the theory of originalism was understood
to apply to particular questions of constitutional law. If the object of the
originalist inquiry is to determine what the Framers actually intended to accomplish, then answering constitutional questions becomes tantamount to an effort
to get into the heads of the Framers—an effort to determine which answer they
expected courts to reach. Thus, Old Originalists tended to answer constitutional
questions by seeking the intent of the Framers with regard to the specific
question at issue—the Framers’ expectations about how the Constitution would
apply to that particular question.84 The constitutionality of segregation, for
example, could be confirmed by ascertaining from the historical sources that the
“‘[F]ramers did not intend or expect . . . to outlaw segregation.’”85 Because
“there was a pervasive assumption that segregation would remain,” the Fourteenth Amendment did not outlaw it.86
When the original intent of the Framers with regard to the specific question
could not be ascertained, the Old Originalism was generally understood to
require judges to ask: “‘What Would the Framers Do?’”87 In other words, the
inquiry became a necessarily hypothetical, but still a narrow, one—an attempt to
“channel[] the [F]ramers” to determine how they would have expected the
Constitution to resolve the narrow question at issue, if they had contemplated
it.88
Implicit in this interpretive method, which Jack Balkin has dubbed “original
expected application” originalism,89 is that judges must answer constitutional

84. See DWORKIN, supra note 73, at 13 (“According to originalism, the great clauses of the Bill of
Rights should be interpreted not as laying down the abstract moral principles they actually describe, but
instead as referring, in a kind of code or disguise, to the [F]ramers’ own assumptions and expectations
about the correct application of those principles.”); Raoul Berger, Originalist Theories of Constitutional
Interpretation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 350, 352–54 (1988) (criticizing as illegitimate any effort to “read
general words in disregard of the specific intention[s]”); Bork, supra note 12, at 13 (same).
85. BERGER, supra note 14, at 118 (quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 100 (2d ed. 1986)).
86. BERGER, supra note 14, at 125.
87. Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference Distinction, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
555, 580 (2006) (describing Raoul Berger’s approach).
88. Barnett, supra note 54, at 111; see Randy E. Barnett, The Relevance of the Framers’ Intent, 19
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 405 (1996) (criticizing “a type of constitutional ‘channeling’ in which the
originalist clairvoyants ask: ‘Oh Framers, tell us what would you think about the following law?’”);
Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177, 219 (1993) (noting that originalists
“inquire how the Framers would have answered a particular question of constitutional law”); Maltz,
supra note 20, at 796 (“In fact, originalist theory simply directs judges to use their best efforts to
determine what the intent of the drafters would be in a particular situation.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Five
Theses on Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 311, 312 (1996) (“For the hard originalist, we are
trying to do something like go back in a time machine and ask the Framers very specific questions
about how we ought to resolve very particular problems.”).
89. See Balkin, supra note 82, at 296.
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questions the same way today as they would have answered them immediately
after the constitutional provision at issue was adopted.90 The correct result in
any given case is the one that the Framers would have expected a judge to
endorse. As such, the reach of the constitutional provision cannot change. No
matter how many years have gone by and how much the world has changed, the
provision applies in only those circumstances in which it would have been
expected to apply when drafted.91
This interpretive approach was (seemingly) mandated by the Old Originalism’s commitment to original intent.92 But it has also been employed as a form
of original meaning jurisprudence93—as an attempt to follow the original public
meaning of the constitutional provision, with the gloss that the original expectations are dispositive evidence of how the original meaning applies to particular
circumstances. On this view, when original expectations can be ascertained,
“the original meaning of a constitutional provision is determined and constrained by the expectations of the framing generation as to how that provision
would be applied to particular problems.”94 In a sense, the original expected
application is the original meaning. That is to say, this approach seems wedded
to the notion that the “meaning” of a constitutional provision is not some sort of
a broad principle that it enacts into law, but rather is a narrow understanding of
what it will actually accomplish.95

90. See id. at 295–97.
91. This view has deep roots. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel, Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 403 (1937)
(Sutherland, J., dissenting) (arguing that it is simply impermissible “to say . . . that the words of the
Constitution mean today what they did not mean when written—that is, that they do not apply to a
situation now to which they would have applied then”).
92. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 2, at 622–23; Barnett, supra note 54, at 105–06; David A.J.
Richards, Originalism Without Foundations, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1373, 1380 (1990) (book review)
(noting that “Berger’s originalism” mandated that a “provision should be interpreted to include certain
things only if those things would have been included within the meaning of the clause by the
Founders”). Indeed, Berger believed that the original expected application of the Framers trumped the
general terms of the text. See O’NEILL, supra note 7, at 127. So too did Bork, at least in his Old
Originalist incarnation. See Bork, supra note 12, at 13 (“The words are general but surely that would
not permit us to escape the [F]ramers’ intent if it were clear . . . . I do not see how the Court could
escape the choices revealed and substitute its own, even though the words are general and conditions
have changed.”). Richard Kay has recently suggested, however, that a jurisprudence of original intent
need not always follow the original expected application of the Framers. See Kay, supra note 22, at
710–11.
93. See Balkin, supra note 82, at 296–97 (noting Justice Scalia’s use of this technique); Colby, supra
note 18, at 573–74 (same); Smith, supra note 48, at 188–89 (same); David Sosa, The Unintentional
Fallacy, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 919, 935 (1998) (reviewing Scalia, supra note 38) (same).
94. Colby, supra note 18, at 573 (describing, but not endorsing, this approach).
95. One way of viewing this distinction is as a debate about “what the meaning of ‘meaning’ is.”
Lawson & Seidman, supra note 58, at 51. The word “meaning” in the phrase “original meaning” is
itself ambiguous. See Balkin, supra note 71, at 552; Solum, supra note 27, at 940–41. It could refer to a
number of distinct concepts, one of which is what Lawrence Solum and Jack Balkin call “semantic
content”: “‘what is the meaning of this word in English?’” Balkin, supra note 71, at 552; accord Solum,
supra note 27, at 940. Another concept that might be invoked by the phrase “original meaning”—
another possible meaning of “meaning”—is what Solum calls the “applicative sense” of meaning,
Solum, supra note 27, at 941, and what Balkin calls the “practical applications” sense of meaning:
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This approach has been heavily criticized not only as unworkable,96 but also
as theoretically indefensible in light of the New Originalism.97 If the originalist
task is an objective one, then it should not particularly matter what the Framers
actually thought (or would have actually thought) about how the abstract
constitutional text would apply to a particular problem. What should matter,
instead, is what the text objectively meant: the (often quite general) principle
that its words are objectively read to enact.98 The framing generation may, after
all, have misunderstood the way in which the principle that they enacted would
apply to particular facts; or their understanding of the facts may have been
mistaken; or the world may have changed enough that the principle now applies
differently to those same facts.99
Thus, originalists (by and large) have come to reject the search for original
expected application.100 As Keith Whittington puts it:
The point of originalist inquiry is not to ask Madison what he would do if he
were a [J]ustice on the Supreme Court hearing the case at issue. The point is
to determine what principle Madison and his contemporaries adopted, and

“‘what does this mean in practice?,’” Balkin, supra note 71, at 552. Original expected application
originalism interprets the phrase “original meaning” as a search for the original meaning in the
applicative sense. Most New Originalists, however, have come to view the phrase “original meaning”
as a search for the original semantic content of the constitutional phrase. See Solum, supra note 27, at
940.
96. The counterfactual inquiry—what would the Framers have thought?—is inherently imprecise
and often profoundly anachronistic. See Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Clichés, 36 CAP. U. L. REV.
493, 504 (2008) (“Any such inquiry is counterfactual and not historical since there is no historical fact
of the matter to be discovered by evidence. Therefore, in practice, reliance on original intent is entirely
a product of judicial judgment in extrapolating speculative principles and metaphorical intentions from
the meaning of the text.”). And even the factual inquiry—what did the Framers actually expect?—may
be stymied either by a lack of evidence or by affirmative evidence that the Framers actually had
conflicting expectations about how the provision would apply to particular facts. See, e.g., Colby, supra
note 18, at 574–75 (explaining, with respect to the Federal Marriage Amendment, that the historical
record is such that it would be “futile” to attempt “to cut through the rhetoric in pursuit of the ‘true’
expectations”).
97. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 82, at 297–303; Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the
Establishment Clause, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 737–38 (2009) (labeling Scalia’s brand of originalism
with respect to the Establishment Clause “‘I Have No Idea’ originalism”).
98. See Smith, supra note 48, at 185, 192 (criticizing original expected application originalism for
failing to recognize that words are open-ended and arguing in favor of an “objective criteria view”);
Solum, supra note 27, at 935 (“The linguistic meaning of a text is one thing, and the expectations about
the application of that meaning to future cases are a different thing.”); Christopher Wolfe, How the
Constitution Was Taken Out of Constitutional Law, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 597, 624–30 (1987).
99. See Green, supra note 87, at 580–81; Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of
Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 569, 584–85 (1998); McConnell, supra note 75, at 1284 (“Mainstream
originalists recognize that the Framers’ analysis of particular applications could be wrong, or that
circumstances could have changed and made them wrong.”); Whittington, supra note 1, at 610–11.
100. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 43–44 (1994);
Barnett, supra note 2, at 622; Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism and Its Discontents (Plus a Thought or
Two About Abortion), 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 385–89 (2007); McConnell, supra note 75, at 1284;
Michael Stokes Paulsen, How To Interpret the Constitution (and How Not To), 115 YALE L.J. 2037,
2059 (2006); Whittington, supra note 1, at 610–11.
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then to figure out whether and how that principle applies to the current
case.101

Originalists have come to the view that, even if the Framers often could not
agree amongst themselves on how they expected the provision to apply to
“particular fact situations,” or even if they were collectively mistaken about
how the provision would apply to “particular fact situations,” there was nonetheless a single public meaning, or “major premise,” enacted by the constitutional
language—and it is that major premise, not the Framers’ particularized expectations, that represents the original constitutional meaning.102
G. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION

The recognition that the Constitution often enacts broad principles, rather
than narrow rules of decision, has fostered another significant development in
originalist thought: the emergence of a distinction between “constitutional
interpretation” and “constitutional construction.”
More than twenty years ago, H. Jefferson Powell criticized originalists because
they “sometimes write as if the interpretative task were over once the interpreter
determined the historical meaning of the relevant constitutional provision. . . .
But th[e] direct translation of history into norm is not possible . . . and an
originalist approach must begin by recognizing this fundamental limit.”103 Ten
years later, David Sosa lodged a similar complaint, chastising originalists for
failing to recognize that, because the constitutional text is often vague and
indeterminate, in many instances “the plain meaning of [the constitutional] text
does not determine its proper application to novel circumstances.”104
Originalists have now come to terms with these objections. When the original
meaning of a constitutional provision is narrow and rule-like, originalism can, at
least in theory, dictate the proper decision in all cases arising under that
provision. In such cases, there can be only one result that is consistent with
original meaning.105 But when the original meaning of a constitutional provision is more abstract and standard-like, originalists have come to recognize that
a commitment to originalism is no longer sufficient to resolve constitutional

101. Whittington, supra note 1, at 611.
102. BORK, supra note 15, at 162–63; see also O’NEILL, supra note 7, at 178 (noting that, in his
Supreme Court confirmation hearings, Bork expressed the view that the Equal Protection Clause could
protect against sex discrimination, notwithstanding the expectations of the Framers to the contrary).
103. H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 662 (1987).
104. Sosa, supra note 93, at 920; see also id. at 930–31 (discussing the conclusion by JOHN R.
SEARLE, THE REDISCOVERY OF THE MIND 178–79 (1992), that “the meaning of an expression cannot
determine its application”).
105. See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 75 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law Ill. Pub. Law &
Legal Theory Research Paper Series, No. 07-24, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id⫽1120244.
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cases.106 As Randy Barnett explains:
[K]nowing the meaning of these words only takes us so far in resolving
current cases and controversies. Due either to ambiguity or vagueness,[107]
the original meaning of the text may not always determine a unique rule of
law to be applied to a particular case or controversy. While not indeterminate,
the original meaning can be “underdeterminate.”108

Thus, “there is often a gap between abstract or general principles of the kind
found in the Constitution and the rules of law that are needed to put these
principles into action.”109 Put differently, for many constitutional provisions, the
original meaning of the Constitution is sufficiently open-ended as to be incapable of resolving most concrete cases.110 There will be multiple rules of
decision that are each consistent with the original meaning of the vague or
ambiguous constitutional command.111
In these instances, constitutional interpretation is insufficient to do the job of
deciding cases.112 In order to decide the case, the judge must pick among the

106. See Barnett, supra note 26, at 263–64 (“Sometimes the original meaning of a text is clear and
rule-like—the age limits for presidents is the favorite example—and it directly dictates the outcome of
a case or controversy. Other times, however, the original meaning is rather abstract, or at a higher level
of generality. A contract law scholar would refer to the text as vague.”).
107. Randy Barnett and Lawrence Solum have helpfully distinguished between these two concepts.
See Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 55 ARK. L.
REV. 847, 852–56 (2003); Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Vagueness and Ambiguity, LEGAL
THEORY BLOG (Aug. 6, 2006, 4:29 PM), http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2006/08/legal_theory_
le.html. In their lexicon, a term is ambiguous if it could have more than one distinct meaning. Barnett,
supra, at 853; Solum, supra. For instance, the word “cool” is ambiguous in that it could refer to
temperature or to social attractiveness. Solum, supra. A term is vague if its meaning is clear, yet that
meaning is open-ended enough that its application to marginal objects is disputable. Barnett, supra, at
852; Solum, supra. For instance, the word “tall” is vague in that there is room for reasonable
disagreement as to whether or not someone who stands six feet, two inches is tall. Solum, supra. Many
words can be both ambiguous and vague. Id. For instance, the word “arms” is ambiguous in that it can
refer both to upper appendages and to weapons. Barnett, supra, at 853. And when its meaning is the
latter one, it is vague in that one can question whether baseball bats or paring knives qualify as “arms.”
Id. at 852.
108. Barnett, supra note 54, at 108.
109. Id. at 109–10.
110. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDEND POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 8 (1999) (“Traditional tools of interpretive analysis can be exhausted without
providing a constitutional meaning that is sufficiently clear to guide government action. The text may
specify a principle that is itself identifiable but is nonetheless indeterminate in its application to a
particular situation . . . . Alternatively, the principle established by the text may be unclear . . . .”
(footnote omitted)); Balkin, supra note 71, at 559–60; Barnett, supra note 2, at 645 (“Due to either
ambiguity or generality, the original meaning of the text may not always determine a unique rule of law
to be applied to a particular case or controversy.”); Whittington, supra note 1, at 611–12.
111. See Barnett, supra note 26, at 264–65.
112. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 645 (“When this happens, interpretation must be supplemented by constitutional construction—within the bounds established by original meaning.”);
Solum, supra note 27, at 974 (“Interpretation is inapt as a method for resolving vagueness, because
interpretation . . . cannot do the required work. When a word or phrase has a linguistic meaning that is
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various rules that could be derived from the original meaning.113 Drawing upon
contract law and theory,114 New Originalists refer to this activity as “constitutional construction.”115 Constitutional construction is necessary when constitutional interpretation “runs out” and cannot dictate a single rule of law adequate
to resolve the case.116 Most constitutional doctrines—the levels of scrutiny,
content-neutrality rules, and the like—are examples of constitutional constructions, not constitutional interpretations.117 They are not precisely mandated by
the original meaning of the constitutional text, but rather, have been invented by
judges in an effort to put the Constitution’s open-ended textual meaning into
effect.118 Constitutional construction, then, aims to produce a rule of decision
“that is consistent with . . . original meaning but not deducible from it.”119

vague, then interpretation runs out. . . . [V]agueness is the result of interpretation and not a problem to
be solved by interpretation.”).
113. Kesavan and Paulsen have made a similar point in the following terms:
Sometimes the right answer, as a matter of interpretation, is that the text admits of a range of
meanings, none of which can fairly be privileged over the others—that is, there is a range of
indeterminacy, even applying correct interpretive methods. In such an event, one needs a
second-order rule for matters of adjudication.
Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 26, at 1129 n.54. The phrase “range of meanings” may be misleading in
this context. A better formulation might be: open-ended meaning capable of supporting a range of rules
and outcomes.
114. See, e.g., Fashion Fabrics of Iowa, Inc. v. Retail Investors Corp., 266 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Iowa
1978) (“Interpretation involves ascertaining the meaning of contractual words; construction refers to
deciding their legal effect.”).
115. Barnett, supra note 26, at 264 (“[A]n original meaning originalist can take the abstract meaning
as given, and accept that the application of this vague meaning to particular cases is left to future actors,
including judges, to decide. The process of applying general abstract provisions to the facts of
particular cases by adopting intermediate doctrines is properly called, not interpretation, but constitutional construction.”); Solum, supra note 105, at 20 (defining constitutional construction as “the activity
of further specifying constitutional rules when the original public meaning of the text is vague (or
underdeterminate for some other reason)”). See generally Solum, supra note 105, at 67–89 (discussing
the distinction between interpretation and construction, and occasions for and theories of constitutional
construction).
116. Id. at 20 (“original-meaning originalist[s] explicitly embrace the idea that the original public
meaning of the text ‘runs out’ and hence that constitutional interpretation must be supplemented by
constitutional construction”); see id. at 69 (“Constitutions must be construed where their semantic
content does not resolve a particular constitutional issue or case . . . .”).
117. See Barnett, supra note 26, at 264–65; Solum, supra note 27, at 978.
118. Cf. Whittington, supra note 1, at 611 (“An abstract text may be subject to judicial manipulation,
but its meaning is historically determined.”).
119. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 121
(2004); see also Barnett, supra note 26, at 265 (noting that “constitutional construction can be
constrained by original meaning while not entirely determined deductively by it”). In this regard,
Stephen Griffin seems perhaps to fail to fully capture the New Originalism when he writes that the
“basic idea of construction is that constitutional meaning can be determined legitimately in a nonjudicial or political framework” and that “construction allows for the introduction of ‘an element of
creativity’ into the interpretive process.” Griffin, supra note 23, at 1217 (quoting WHITTINGTON, supra
note 110, at 5). According to the New Originalists, construction has nothing to do with “determining”
the “constitutional meaning”; it seeks to put that meaning into action. The “element of creativity”
comes not in “the interpretive process”—determining the meaning—but rather in deciding which of the
various rules of decision that would be consistent with that meaning should be implemented.
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On this way of thinking, originalism, by definition, does not and cannot
dictate a “proper” constitutional construction. “It is important to keep in mind
that originalism is warranted as a theory of interpretation—that is, as a method
of determining the meaning of the words written in the Constitution.”120 That is
as far as originalism can take us. When originalist interpretation produces a
meaning that is not specific enough to resolve the issue at hand, we must go
beyond originalism in order to decide the case. There can be no originalist
answer to the question of which construction to apply; by definition, construction supplements interpretation and cannot be dictated by it. Thus, “theories of
constitutional construction are outside the domain of originalism as a theory of
constitutional interpretation.”121 Indeed, theories about the proper way to go
about the task of constitutional construction are not theories of constitutional
interpretation at all.122
In this regard, originalists have responded to Powell’s criticism by refining
their approach. Originalists do indeed continue to “write as if the interpretative
task were over once the interpreter determined the historical meaning of the
relevant constitutional provision,”123 but they now recognize that “direct translation of history into norm is [often] not possible,”124 and they understand that
originalism itself often cannot determine a single rule of decision.125
120. Barnett, supra note 54, at 108.
121. Solum, supra note 27, at 967.
122. The distinction between interpretation and construction was anticipated by Michael Perry—a
leading New Originalist—who, in the early 1990s, used the terms “constitutional interpretation” and
“constitutional specification” to articulate a similar point:
[T]he question of the proper judicial approach to constitutional interpretation—to the interpretation of the constitutional text—should not be confused with the different question of the
proper judicial approach to constitutional specification—to the specification of indeterminate
constitutional norms or directives represented by the constitutional text. Constitutional adjudication comprises two distinct inquiries. There is, first, the interpretive inquiry, the inquiry into
what directive or directives a particular provision of the constitutional text represents.
Originalism is a position about the proper judicial approach to the interpretive inquiry. It bears
emphasis that originalism is not a position about the proper judicial approach to the second
inquiry: the normative inquiry, the inquiry into what shape to give, in a particular context, an
indeterminate directive represented, or believed to be represented, by a particular provision of
the constitutional text. Originalism is a position about constitutional interpretation, not about
constitutional specification.
Perry, supra note 57, at 87. Perry explains that the “aim of the normative inquiry is to specify or shape
the directive; it is to render the directive determinate in a particular context.” Id. at 105. “A
specification ‘of a principle for a specific class of cases is not a deduction from it, nor a discovery of
some implicit meaning; it is the act of setting a more concrete and categorical requirement in the spirit
of the principle . . . .’” Id. at 110 (quoting Neil MacCormick, Reconstruction After Deconstruction: A
Response to CLS, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 539, 548 (1990)). “The challenge of specifying an
indeterminate constitutional directive, then, is the challenge of deciding how best to achieve, how best
to ‘instantiate,’ in a particular context, the political-moral value embedded in the directive.” Perry,
supra note 57, at 109.
123. Powell, supra note 103, at 662 (emphasis added).
124. Id.
125. In this manner, the distinction between interpretation and construction is also responsive to
Cass Sunstein’s observation from more than a decade ago that, if one interprets the Constitution at a
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H. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN NORMATIVE AND SEMANTIC ORIGINALISM

A final step in the transition from the Old to the New Originalism involved
the recognition of a distinction between an interpretive question—what does the
Constitution mean?—and a normative question—should judges be obligated to
follow the Constitution’s meaning? This was a distinction that at least some
Old Originalists had recognized. Raoul Berger, for instance, observed:
“Whether the ‘original intention’ of the [F]ramers should be binding on the
present generation . . . should be distinguished from the issue: what did the
[F]ramers mean to accomplish, what did the words they used mean to them.”126
But to the Old Originalists, originalism was more than simply an interpretive
theory of meaning; it was an adjudicative theory as well. It entailed a judicial
commitment to follow the original meaning (which, to Old Originalists, meant
original intent).127 After all, Old Originalists expended a great deal of effort
justifying their theory on normative grounds: arguing that judges must be
originalists because deciding cases on the basis of anything but the original
meaning of the Constitution is illegitimate and inconsistent with both democracy and the rule of law.128
Many New Originalists, however, have come to the view that originalism can
be understood as a purely interpretive theory. This step was taken perhaps most
clearly and forcefully by Gary Lawson in a wonderfully clever 1997 essay that
chastises constitutional theorists of all stripes for their “failure to distinguish
theories of interpretation from theories of adjudication.”129 Lawson argues that
“interpreting the Constitution and applying the Constitution are two different
enterprises.”130 “[A] theory of interpretation allows us to determine what the
Constitution truly means, while a theory of adjudication allows us to determine
what role, if any, the Constitution’s meaning should play in particular decisions.”131 “One must first determine, through interpretation, what the Constitution means. Then, and only then, can one determine whether the properly
interpreted Constitution generates any political obligations . . . .”132 Lawson
explains that originalism need only be concerned with the first step of this
inquiry: “[T]he merit of originalism as a . . . theory of interpretation does not
broader level of abstraction, “originalism needs supplementation” in order to be able to resolve real
cases. Sunstein, supra note 88, at 313–14.
126. BERGER, supra note 14, at 8.
127. See id. at 402–10; Maltz, supra note 20, at 776; cf. O’NEILL, supra note 7, at 126 (characterizing Raoul Berger’s originalism as a “process-restraint approach” that “would maximize space for
legislative politics”). See generally supra section I.A.
128. See Colby & Smith, supra note 24, at 273–81, 288–90 (detailing these arguments).
129. Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1823 (1997).
130. Id. at 1835.
131. Id. at 1824.
132. Id. at 1823; see also Lawson & Seidman, supra note 58, at 53 (“When faced with an instruction
manual, you must make two distinct decisions. First, you must decide whether you want to try to
understand the instructions that it contains. If the answer is yes, this requires interpreting, or ‘expounding,’ the manual. Second, once you understand (or expound) the instructions, you must then decide
whether you want to follow them. These are conceptually separate inquiries.”).
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depend on social contract theory or any other theory of political legitimacy. One
can be a strict interpretative originalist and forcefully deny that the Constitution
has any political legitimacy.”133 Lawson gives the example of an eighteenthcentury recipe for fried chicken found hidden in an old house. The meaning of
the recipe is its original public meaning—the meaning it would have had to
readers at the time that it was written. Whether cooks today ought to follow the
recipe is an entirely distinct question.134
A decade later, Lawrence Solum reiterated and developed the theoretical
foundation for this point by drawing extensively upon the philosophy of language.135 Solum’s sophisticated argument is rich and theoretical, but its upshot
is simple: “What words mean is one thing; what we should do about their
meaning is another.”136
II. THE BENEFITS OF THE NEW ORIGINALISM
The theoretical moves recounted above have been, on the whole, positive
developments for originalism, at least insofar as they have boosted its stature
within the scholarly community. Before those moves, the academic consensus
was that originalism did not work—that it did not stand up to scrutiny.137
Originalists themselves fully recognized that the Old Originalism was not
respected within the academy.138 They lamented that “a devotee of the Framers’

133. Lawson, supra note 129, at 1825; see also Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 26, at 1127–28
(arguing that a choice to be bound by the Constitution is necessarily a choice to be bound by its original
public meaning, but noting that “[o]ne might legitimately decide, as a political matter, not to treat ‘this
Constitution’ as authoritative—that is, not to agree to be bound by the written document as supreme law
in the first place”); Lawson & Seidman, supra note 58, at 53 (“We have nothing to say about whether
any particular people . . . should try to follow the instructions in the Constitution once they are
understood. That is a substantial question of political morality, not of interpretative theory, and we are
not political moralists.”); McConnell, supra note 75, at 1285 (“It may be that, for various reasons, law
either cannot or should not be conducted on the basis of interpretive fidelity.”); Paulsen, supra note 100,
at 2062 (whether to be bound by the original meaning “is a political theory problem external to
constitutional law”). H. Jefferson Powell made this same observation in 1987. See Powell, supra note
103, at 662 (“History cannot answer or even address the question of whether modern Americans ought
to obey the intentions of the Constitution’s founders. That question belongs to political theory (or
philosophy) or constitutional law and must be answered in the terms of those other spheres of
discourse.”).
134. See Lawson, supra note 129, at 1825–32 (expanding the analogy). For further discussion of this
analogy, see infra notes 257–76 and accompanying text.
135. See Solum, supra note 105, at 27–30.
136. Id. at 30; see also John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism:
A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 754–55
(2009) (distinguishing between positive and normative originalist theories).
137. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 25, at 661 (suggesting that “academic debate . . . has demonstrated
that a strong form of originalism lacks satisfactory theoretical grounding”); Sanford Levinson, Law as
Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373, 378 (1982) (noting that originalism is “increasingly without defenders,
at least in the academic legal community”); Richards, supra note 92, at 1402 (arguing that Bork’s
originalism “fails to meet the intellectual and moral tests to which such [a theory] must be held”).
138. See, e.g., Maltz, supra note 20, at 773 (“Within the scholarly legal community . . . originalism
is in disrepute.”).
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intent is likely to be labeled . . . intellectually backward.”139 As Randy Barnett
once put it: “If ever a theory had a stake driven through its heart, it seems to be
originalism.”140
The Old Originalism simply had no answer for the theoretical shelling that it
was taking from the nonoriginalist camp.141 Thus, as far back as 1987, H.
Jefferson Powell had argued that if originalism wanted to be taken seriously, it
needed to abandon its ill-fated focus on original intent and regroup around the
notion of an objective original meaning.142 When originalism did so, and
evolved in the related ways discussed above, it moved onto much more sound
theoretical footing.
That is not, of course, to say that each of the New Originalist moves just
recounted is above academic reproach. Many of them have indeed been subjected to powerful criticism.143 It is just to say that they help; individually, and
especially taken as a whole, they improve and refine the theory of originalism.
And they make it more difficult to argue with. Many of the old arguments—
the ones that demolished the Old Originalism—no longer hit with quite the
same force. Yes, it may be a fool’s errand to seek to divine the collective intent
of a multimember body.144 And yes, the historical evidence may reveal a range
of intentions (or understandings or expectations) among the various Framers
because there may not have been a consensus at the time of the framing.145 And
yes, the historical evidence is often conflicting.146 And yes, when it comes right
139. Id. at 774; see also Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise Exemptions and the Siren Song
of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245, 249 (1991) (noting that most nonoriginalists “do not take
[originalism] seriously,” and instead view it as “impossible,” “intellectually naı̈ve,” “a cynical apology
for a conservative political agenda,” or “worse”); Jonathan R. Macey, Originalism as an “Ism,” 19
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 301, 301 (1996) (“Outside the comfortable confines of the Federalist Society,
originalism is far from fashionable. Indeed among constitutional law scholars at elite schools, the idea
of being an originalist is tantamount to being some sort of intellectual Luddite.”).
140. Barnett, supra note 2, at 613.
141. See id. at 612–13. Some originalists even recognized this point. See Maltz, supra note 20, at
774 (acknowledging that “many of the more sophisticated attacks on originalist theory have remained
largely unanswered”). In fairness, however, this observation should be qualified by noting that Richard
Kay authored a generally powerful and sophisticated defense of the jurisprudence of original intent
around this same time. See Kay, supra note 34.
142. See Powell, supra note 103, at 659–60, 659 n.1.
143. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 25, at 663 (arguing that the distinction between expected
application and objective principles “resists intelligent application”); id. at 663 n.31 (criticizing and
choosing “not to honor [the distinction between interpretation and construction]”); Kay, supra note 22,
at 721 (arguing that the notion that one can interpret a constitutional provision at the level of generality
at which a hypothetical reasonable observer would have understood the text to be written does not work
because the text may “simply . . . not specify one or another level of generality. No amount of
philological exertion will change that.”); Smith, supra note 5, at 25–26 (arguing that original expected
application may not be conceptually distinguishable from original objective public meaning); see also
infra notes 162–64 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction between semantic and normative
originalism).
144. See Brest, supra note 34, at 213–17; Farber, supra note 52, at 1089.
145. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary
Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 435 (1986); Powell, supra note 103, at 684, 690–91.
146. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 145; Powell, supra note 103, at 688–89; Sherry, supra note 50.
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down to it, we can never truly know “how various people in fact understood
particular phrases a century or two ago.”147 But those objections—harmful as
they were to the Old Originalism—are not fatal to the New one. What matters to
the New Originalism is not the actual intent or expectations of any individual or
group, or even the shared understanding of the people as a whole. The New
Originalism does not depend on an ability to determine actual, historical “fact”
at all.148 Rather, what matters is simply the objective meaning that a hypothetical observer would reasonably have understood the language to reflect.149
A New Originalist is thus not “discouraged by the fact that there was no
actual, shared public understanding of the meaning of the text any more than
she would be deterred by the fact that there was no single intent of the Framers
and no shared public expectation of how the Amendment would apply.”150
Instead, “she would opine that, due to imperfect information, misleading rhetoric, or flawed interpretation, the true meaning of the text . . . had been wrongly
understood by one side or the other. Her task would be to use the tools of
textualist interpretation to determine which side had it right.”151 Indeed, she
might well conclude that the objective meaning of the text refers to a very
general principle, which would account for the Framers’ conflicting expectations and intentions about how it would apply to particular circumstances. All of
their expectations, conflicting though they were, may have been consistent with
(though not mandated by) the objective original meaning.
By the same token, it might well be the case that the historical record is
incomplete and gives us no guidance on the Framers’ views with respect to
particular questions.152 And it may well be that the Framers never contemplated
contemporary problems or even anything remotely resembling them.153 And it

147. Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW,
supra note 38, at 65, 72.
148. Thus, the New Originalism is also less damaged by the inaccuracy of the historical record of
the framing and ratification, see Hutson, supra note 52, than is the Old Originalism. Because the Old
Originalism necessitated a search for the intentions and understandings reflected in those records, the
reliability of the records was essential to its success. But the New Originalism entails a search for an
objective public meaning, not for the actual views of the drafters or the ratifiers.
149. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 26, at 257–58 (“Determining the public meaning of the words of
the Constitution is much more practical than discovering the myriad subjective intentions of those who
wrote or ratified it. That there is a unique original public meaning is a far more plausible claim than that
one can discern a unique original intention from the potentially conflicting intentions of the various
[F]ramers.”); Lawson & Seidman, supra note 58, at 62–67 (noting the strength of the summing of
intentions objection but arguing that the move to a hypothetical reasonable person standard successfully
overcomes it).
150. Colby, supra note 18, at 584.
151. Id. (footnote omitted).
152. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 52, at 1087–88, 1104; Kramer, supra note 7, at 909; Powell, supra
note 103, at 669.
153. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 52, at 1093–95 (noting that many contemporary issues could not
even have been conceived of at time of the framing); Powell, supra note 103, at 664–65 (“[T]he vast
majority of contemporary constitutional disputes involve facts, practices, and problems that were not
considered or even dreamt of by the founders.”).
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may well be that the world has changed so much since the framing that we
cannot productively seek to figure out what the Framers would have thought had
they contemplated today’s issues.154 But those objections—devastating to the
Old Originalism—do not trouble the New Originalist, for all that she needs to
do is discover the principle that the Framers objectively codified and apply that
principle herself to the new, unforeseen (and likely unforeseeable) problems.
Many of the other principal objections to the Old Originalism are similarly
minimalized by the New Originalism. H. Jefferson Powell’s evidence that the
Framers did not intend intentionalist interpretation, for instance, is actually a
feather in the New Originalism’s cap; Powell’s sources by and large support the
claim that the Framers did intend the text to be interpreted according to its
objective public meaning.155 Similarly, the New Originalism wholeheartedly
concurs with the old objection that the people could not have been bound by the
intent of those who drafted the Constitution—because the drafters had no
lawmaking authority on their own156—and thus, the New Originalism addresses
this objection by binding the people only to the objective public meaning that
they and the ratifiers—who did have lawmaking authority—would have understood. Likewise, the objection that originalism necessarily entails judicial subjectivity—because the choice of the level of generality at which to read a
constitutional provision inherently requires a subjective value choice157—is at
least ostensibly obviated by the New Originalism’s decision to adopt the level
of generality that is objectively reflected in the words of the text. And the
objection that judges, as opposed to historians, lack the skills and training to
divine historical intentions158 is answered by the New Originalism’s shifting the
focus from subjective individual intentions to objective textual analysis. Historians are best equipped to determine the actual views of historical figures, but
judges are best equipped to determine the hypothetical views of the reasonable
person; that is something that judges do all of the time.159
Finally, the New Originalism has answers to the most central of all objections

154. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read the Federalist but Not
Statutory Legislative History?, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1301, 1310–11 (1998); Greene, supra note 25, at
667; Powell, supra note 103, at 673–74.
155. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 627–28; Farber, supra note 52, at 1090 (noting that Powell’s
argument was that the Framers used the word “intent” to “refer[] to the objective meaning of the
language used in the document, not the subjective intentions of the authors”).
156. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 7, at 909; Lofgren, supra note 35, at 84–85.
157. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court 1988 Term—Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 93 (1989); Powell, supra note 103, at 665. For a discussion of this objection,
see supra note 73 and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 52, at 1089; William E. Nelson, History and Neutrality in
Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 1237, 1250–51 (1986).
159. See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 58, at 50, 79–80 (“If, however, constitutional meaning
depends upon a distinctively legal construct such as the reasonable person, as we maintain, then
determining constitutional meaning is more properly the province of legal experts.”); cf. William
Michael Treanor, Against Textualism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 983, 984 (2009) (“One need not be trained as
an historian (or know a great deal of history) to recover original meaning.”).
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to the Old Originalism: the concern that originalism subjects us to the rule of
the dead hand of the past, which is unacceptable both in theory—why should
we be bound by the value choices of rich, white, slaveholding men who died
200 years ago?160—and in practice—it would bind us to a set of rights, and a
view of equality, that is unconscionably cramped by the standards of modern
civilization.161
The New Originalism answers that concern in part by ducking it. The
distinction between normative and semantic originalism allows New Originalists to cabin objections of this sort by claiming that originalism is simply a
theory of what the Constitution means. Originalism does not speak to the
provocative question of whether we should be bound by the original meaning.162
That response is something of a cop out. Our legal system and legal culture
presuppose that judges must follow the law, so if the meaning of the Constitution is its original public meaning, then it goes without saying that judges will
have to follow it.163 Indeed, as Michael Stokes Paulsen—himself a New Originalist proponent of this distinction—points out, since judges take an oath to
support the Constitution, acceptance of the New Originalism entails a conclusion that they are bound to follow its original public meaning, regardless of
whether doing so makes sense as a matter of justice and political theory;
anything else would be “revolution by [J]udiciary.”164
But the New Originalism mitigates the dead hand concern in a more profound
way as well. Once we accept that the original meaning often reflects a high level
of generality—such that the Framers’ abstract principles will still bind us, but
not their specific intentions and expectations—then we are not so much ruled by
the dead hand of the past as gently guided by it. The New Originalism allows us
a great deal of leeway to “construct” constitutional doctrine that is consistent
with our generation’s views of the scope of “equal protection of the law,” “due

160. See, e.g., Brest, supra note 34, at 225; Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 357 (1985) (“The dead hand of the past ought not to govern, for example,
our treatment of the liberty of free speech, and any theory of interpretation that demands that it does is a
bad theory.”); Larry G. Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist
Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1482, 1499–1500 (1985) (“The Constitution was adopted
by propertied, white males who had no strong incentives to attend to the concerns and interests of the
impoverished, the nonwhites, or nonmales who were alive then, much less those of us alive today who
hold conceptions of our interests and selves very different from the ones held by those in the original
clique.”). For recent incarnations of the dead hand objection, see Leib, supra note 4, at 358–60; Richard
A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 165, 192 & n.104 (2008).
161. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Reply, Recipe for Trouble: Some Thoughts on Meaning, Translation
and Normative Theory, 85 GEO. L.J. 1857, 1862 (1997); Farber, supra note 52, at 1095–96; Sunstein,
supra note 88, at 312 (“The problem with hard originalism . . . is not that it is indeterminate, but that it
would result in an unacceptably narrow set of liberties for the United States in the Twentieth Century.”).
162. See supra section I.H.
163. See Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 31–33 (2009); Dorf, supra
note 161, at 1860; Smith, supra note 5, at 26–28.
164. Paulsen, supra note 100, at 2063.
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process of law,” and the like.165 Constitutional construction affords plenty of
room to maneuver according to contemporary values.166 Thus, for instance, the
New Originalism allows us to ban segregation, and to grant constitutional
protection to abortion rights, contraceptive rights, and even gay marriage, even
though the Framers would never have intended or expected those particular
results.167
I should make clear that I do not mean to say that the New Originalism is
completely successful in its efforts to parry the dead-hand problem—or any of
the other objections to the Old Originalism, for that matter.168 There are plenty
of reasons to be skeptical on that front.169 Perhaps chief among them is that, as
many New Originalists themselves have recognized, the original objective
meaning can often be established only by recourse to evidence of original intent
or original expected application. That is to say, in many cases, the text is so
abstract that the objective, hypothetical, reasonable person’s understanding can
be discerned only by an examination of the actual views of actual historical
persons.170 As such, despite all of the brassy sound and fury about abandoning

165. See supra notes 66–71 and accompanying text.
166. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 44, at 206 (arguing that the distinction between interpretation and
construction mitigates the dead-hand problem); Balkin, supra note 82, at 303 (arguing that the New
Originalism recognizes that “the Constitution is more than the dead hand of the past, but is a continuing
project that each generation takes on”); Balkin, supra note 78, at 433–34 (arguing that the move from
original expected application to original meaning undercuts the dead hand objection); Eric J. Segall, A
Century Lost: The End of the Originalism Debate, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 411, 431–32 (1998) (noting that
higher levels of generality mitigate the dead-hand problem).
167. See infra section III.B.
168. Thus, Randy Barnett may be a little overzealous when he asserts that the “familiar criticisms”
of originalism have been “largely neutralized.” Barnett, supra note 26, at 258.
169. See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 23, at 1186 (“New originalists claim that focusing on the public
meaning of the Constitution addresses the chief flaws of originalism exposed in earlier debates. This
claim is questionable. Many serious objections were lodged against earlier forms of originalism and the
new originalism does not purport to deal with them all.” (footnote omitted)); Griffin, supra note 23, at
1205 (arguing that even the New Originalism suffers from “history without historicism”: the attempt to
“use evidence from the past without considering the reality of historical change”); Leib, supra note 4, at
358–59 (arguing that the New Originalism, as practiced by Jack Balkin, does not answer the dead-hand
objection); see also Griffin, supra note 23, at 1215 (“One characteristic of originalism, whether old or
new, is a failure to take accurate measure of the differentness of the constitutional past and to fully
acknowledge the incongruous nature of the quest to restore original meaning. Gauging the differentness
of the past is not a matter of reading this or that clause, but appreciating that the founding generation
had an essentially different outlook on key constitutional values.”).
170. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT
224 (1999) (arguing that because original meaning can usually be established only by looking at what
people actually thought, “the movement from ‘intentions’ to ‘meaning’ is not a movement from
something (entirely) subjective to something (entirely) objective”); Randy E. Barnett, Underlying
Principles, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 405, 410 (2007) (agreeing with Jack Balkin “that evidence of the
intentions of the Framers and ratifiers is often highly relevant to determining the public meaning of the
words they decided to enact”); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power To
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 556 (1994) (arguing that “everyone agrees” that “there is a range
of genuine textual ambiguity about the original meaning” of the principal rights-bearing clauses, such
that “the constitutional text, read alone, can give only incomplete answers as to the original understanding. The originalist inquiry, then, has usually been pushed back from purely textual arguments to
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actual intentions, understandings, and expectations, the historical inquiry (with
all of its seemingly insurmountable problems) continues to haunt even the New
Originalism and may render it nearly as impossible in practice as its precursor.171 And on top of that, the New Originalism arguably invites its own
additional objections.172
Thus, it may well be that, at the end of the day, the New Originalism is still,
as Mitchell Berman so colorfully puts it, “[b]unk.”173 Indeed, to hear many New
Originalists tell it, the Supreme Court’s recent landmark decision in District of
Columbia v. Heller174 is a triumph of the New Originalism.175 If that is so, then
perhaps all of the fancy theoretical footwork has amounted to nothing more than

arguments based on evidence from the Constitution’s enactment and postenactment history.”); Colby,
supra note 18, at 598–99; Kay, supra note 22, at 714 (“Only in the most inventive academic
hypotheticals . . . will [original intent and original public meaning] employ different techniques or yield
different results.”); Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519,
549 n.133, 556–60 (2003); Solum, supra note 27, at 935 (“The fact that original expected applications
are distinct from original meanings should not imply that the two are unrelated. Expected applications
of a text may offer evidence about its meanings, even if these applications are neither decisive evidence
of meaning nor meaning itself.”); Smith, supra note 5, at 19–20, 20 n.61.
171. See, e.g., Colby, supra note 18, at 583–86, 597–99; Nelson, supra note 170, at 557; Alexander,
supra note 22, at 6 (noting that an objective, well-informed, hypothetical reasonable observer might
well have been aware of conflicting possible meanings, and thus, would not have been able to identify a
single, objectively correct one); see also Kramer, supra note 7, at 911 (“Yet public meaning originalism
has some pretty serious defects of its own—the main one being that there was no agreed-upon public
meaning of the constitutional terms most often in dispute.”). But see infra section IV.A (positing that
the New Originalism may not be “impossible” so much as it is ineffective, but suggesting that these are
really just two ways of articulating the same substantive point).
172. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 22, at 4 & n.6 (explaining that proponents of original meaning
originalism “[l]eav[e] aside the arbitrariness of constructing this hypothetical member of the public—
what did he or she know about the authors and their context, how fluent was he or she, where did he or
she live, how generally informed was he or she, and so on” and stating that this is a “very deep but
almost never noted difficulty” with the original public meaning approach); see also Robert W. Bennett,
Originalism: Lessons from Things that Go Without Saying, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 645, 648 (2008)
(making a similar point); Saul Cornell, Heller, New Originalism, and Law Office History: “Meet the
New Boss, Same as the Old Boss,” 56 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1101–06 (2009) (arguing that the New
Originalism is inconsistent with the principal interpretive methodologies actually endorsed by the
framing generation); Cornell, supra, at 1098–1100 (questioning whether the New Originalism is simply
“law office philosophy”); Kay, supra note 22, at 721–23 (lodging an objection similar to Alexander’s
and Bennett’s); Treanor, supra note 159, at 986 (arguing that the framing generation did not afford such
primacy to text, and thus, “if we are to recapture the original public meaning, we should look beyond text in
precisely the same way that the Founding generation did, looking to drafting history, the spirit of the document,
and structural and policy concerns”). For another objection to the New Originalism, see infra note 297.
173. Berman, supra note 163, at 1. Berman’s chief objection focuses not on the impossibility of
originalism in practice, but rather, on the inability of originalists to offer a defensible theoretical
explanation for their central claim that, as a matter of constitutional legitimacy, the original public
meaning must virtually always trump all other sources of possible constitutional meaning. See id. at
93–94. This Article, for the most part, leaves this important objection to the side.
174. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
175. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, News Flash: The Constitution Means What It Says, WALL ST. J.,
June 27, 2008, at A13 (“Justice Scalia’s opinion is the finest example of what is now called ‘original
public meaning’ jurisprudence ever adopted by the Supreme Court.”); Solum, supra note 27, at 940
(noting that “it is hard to imagine finding a clearer example of original public meaning originalism in an
actual judicial decision”).
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dancing in place. As both Mark Tushnet and Saul Cornell have powerfully
argued, Heller’s dubious use of historical sources to reach the conclusion that
the original public meaning of the Second Amendment just happens to perfectly
reflect the views of the modern Republican Party calls the New Originalism into
serious question.176
My object here is neither to venerate the New Originalism nor to pillory it. It
is simply to point out that, when it comes to addressing the core objections to
the originalist project, the New Originalism is noticeably better equipped than
its predecessor.177 It has a kind of an intellectual heft and sophistication that the
Old Originalism lacked. And thus, it has done what the Old Originalism could
never do: achieve a respectable place in the pantheon of constitutional theory.178
Randy Barnett brags that, thanks to its theoretical maturation, originalism “is
now the prevailing approach to constitutional interpretation” and has “virtually
triumphed over its rivals.”179 Ethan Leib, a committed nonoriginalist, regrettably concurs: “It certainly seems like the originalists are winning.”180 These are
probably overstatements.181 But what is indisputable is that, of late, originalism

176. See Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia
v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625, 626, 630 (2008) (responding to Randy Barnett that “[r]ather than
vindicate plain-meaning originalism, Scalia’s decision demonstrates that plain-meaning originalism is
not a neutral interpretive methodology, but little more than a lawyer’s version of a magician’s parlor
trick—admittedly clever, but without any intellectual heft,” and arguing that Heller’s particular use of
historical texts “is intellectually dishonest and suggests that Justice Scalia’s brand of plain-meaning
originalism is little more than a smoke screen for his own political agenda”); Mark Tushnet, Heller and
the New Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 610, 617 (2008) (concluding that “the new originalism
cannot deliver on its promises, as Heller shows” because “[t]he new originalism, like the old, fails to
deliver on its claim about eliminating judicial subjectivity, judgment, and choice.”); see also Daniel O.
Conkle, Judicial Activism and Fourteenth Amendment Privacy Claims: The Allure of Originalism and
the Unappreciated Promise of Constrained Nonoriginalism, 14 NEXUS: CHAPMAN’S J.L. & POL’Y 31,
36 (2009) (making a similar point about Heller). For a disillusioned originalist take on Heller, see
Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343,
1345 (2009) (arguing that Heller “was a near perfect opportunity for the Court to demonstrate that
original meaning jurisprudence is not just ‘living constitutionalism for conservatives,’” and concluding
that the Justices “flunked [their] test” in a way that may be “widely (though unfairly) seen as an
embarrassment for the interpretive approach that the Court purported to employ”).
177. See, e.g., Conkle, supra note 176, at 35 (arguing that originalism has “matured” to meet the
objections raised by nonoriginalists); Greene, supra note 25, at 672 (“These versions of originalism are
less susceptible to (though not wholly immune from) the critiques I have outlined.”); Kramer, supra
note 7, at 911 (“Public meaning originalism is the prevalent version of originalism today, which makes
sense given the way it responds to the critiques of both original understanding originalism and original
intent originalism.”); Sunstein, supra note 88, at 313 (“Soft originalism thus does not run afoul of the
problems faced by hard originalism . . . .”).
178. See Barnett, supra note 26, at 257 (accurately observing that the New Originalism is “an
intellectual contender”).
179. Barnett, supra note 2, at 613; see also Rosenthal, supra note 20, at 4 n.13 (collecting authorities
who agree that originalism is now the prevailing interpretive approach).
180. Leib, supra note 4, at 353.
181. Mitchell Berman has noted that the tendency of some commentators to proclaim that “we are
all originalists now” is largely the result of the inherent imprecision of the term “originalism.” See
Berman, supra note 163, at 29 & n.72. If originalism refers to the notion that original intent and
meaning matter in constitutional interpretation, then we are all indeed originalists. See infra note 244
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is winning over theorists at a rate that would have been impossible back in the
days of the Old Originalism.182 And even among those who have not endorsed
it, it is increasingly, though certainly not universally, being treated with genuine
respect, rather than disdain.
III. THE COST OF THE NEW ORIGINALISM
But this academic acceptance has come at great cost.183 Twenty years ago, as
the nascent New Originalism was just beginning to emerge, Erwin Chemerinsky
made a remarkably insightful observation:

and accompanying text. But if originalism refers to the notion that the discoverable original meaning is
generally dispositive—which is what most self-professed originalists mean to argue, see supra note
1—then we are surely not all originalists now. See Berman, supra note 163, at 29 n.72.
182. See Conkle, supra note 176, at 35 (noting that originalism is rapidly gaining adherents); cf.
Barnett, supra note 26, at 257 (stating that originalism “has thrived like no other approach to
interpretation”).
183. In addition to the cost that is the primary focus of this Article, it is worth mentioning two others
that have been noted elsewhere. First, the splintering of originalism that has inevitably accompanied its
theoretical maturation—the emergence of countless mutually exclusive originalist theories—has undermined the normative arguments often promulgated in its favor:
If even originalists cannot agree about what originalism is and what it entails, then how can
originalism be uniquely coherent and self-evidently correct? And because different versions of
originalism focus on different historical criteria—and, as a result, frequently produce different
constitutional meanings—how can originalists maintain that originalism is uniquely determinate, and thus uniquely consistent with law and democracy? Finally, when one recognizes that
the diversity of originalist theories allows originalist judges to pick and choose among the
various strands of originalism from case to case to reach results that accord with their personal
policy preferences, one is left to question the assertion that originalism is uniquely resistant to
judicial activism.
Colby & Smith, supra note 24, at 247.
Second, originalists were once (and sometimes still are) fond of arguing that a “great merit of
originalism” is “that it is a ‘simple’ concept.” Raoul Berger, Original Intent and Boris Bittker, 66 IND.
L.J. 723, 755 (1991) (quoting Thomas Grey). Originalism, they insist, is “almost self-evidently
correct,” Lino A. Graglia, “Interpreting” the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019,
1020 (1992), and “so obvious that it should hardly need a name, let alone a defense,” Steven G.
Calabresi, Op-Ed, The Right Judicial Litmus Test, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2007, at A23. See also Greene,
supra note 25, at 708 (noting that “originalism’s simplicity is also one of its chief selling points and,
therefore, one if its greatest strengths”); Richards, supra note 92, at 1399 (noting originalism’s
“appealingly simple slogan”). But the New Originalism is anything but simple. Its philosophical
complexity and sophistication make it more palatable to constitutional theorists, but at the same time,
such complexity and sophistication make it much harder for lawyers and judges to understand and
apply it, or for lay audiences to see any obvious, commonsensical merit to it. See Smith, supra note 5,
at 9–10 (“[O]riginalism is supposed to be an approach that actual lawyers and judges can employ in
deciding actual cases. So if the approach becomes so conceptually cumbersome that only a theoretical
elite can fully understand and participate in it, then what good is originalism? It would be as if a new
Henry Ford were to design the perfect car, except that it is so complicated that only people with
advanced degrees in engineering can actually drive it. . . . [S]ophistication robs originalism of [its]
commonsensical quality . . . depriv[ing] the approach of a major part of its reason for being.”); Tushnet,
supra note 176, at 615–16 (noting that the “[O]ld [O]riginalism’s great appeal was its apparent
simplicity,” whereas “the [N]ew [O]riginalism is a complicated account of constitutional interpretation”
with “many moving parts, and it is replete with distinctions that are hardly intuitive”).
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In response to . . . criticisms, most originalists have come to reject specific
intent originalism and instead claim that interpretation should be consistent
with the [F]ramers’ abstract intentions. . . . Although proponents of originalism defend it as a way to constrain the Court, the constraint vanishes once
they concede that the Court need only be faithful to the [F]ramers’ abstract
intentions.184

This, said Chemerinsky, posed a “conundrum—to be nonabsurd originalism
must look to abstract intent but looking to abstract intent does not eliminate
judicial value choices.”185 Thus, originalism seemed to offer a no-win choice
between “constraint at the price of absurdity, or flexibility at the cost of judicial
value imposition.”186 Twenty years later, originalists have made their choice.
Although the New Originalism has deviated in its particulars from what Chemerinsky had in mind—it does not rely on “abstract intent,” but rather on abstract,
objective textual meaning—Chemerinsky’s basic observation was dead on.
Originalism could choose constraint or it could choose intellectual respectability, but it could not achieve both. It opted for respectability (“nonabsurd[ity]” as
Chemerinsky harshly put it187), and it sacrificed constraint in order to get it.
Originalism has earned scholarly respect at the expense of the very promise that
used to be its defining trait.
This Part begins by explaining that sophistication in originalist theory necessarily produces flexibility. It then goes on to articulate the profound extent of
that flexibility—the extraordinary degree to which the New Originalism, despite
the protests of many of its adherents, fails to constrain judges.

184. Chemerinsky, supra note 157, at 92–93 (footnote omitted); see also Chemerinsky, supra note
157, at 94 (arguing that, once he began to accept more abstract intentions, “[n]o longer could Judge
Bork claim that his approach had the methodological superiority of excluding the Justices’ values from
decision[]making”).
185. Chemerinsky, supra note 157, at 93.
186. Id. at 94. That same year, Lawrence Solum penned an insightful essay in which he similarly
noted that
[a]s originalism has been modified and defined in reaction to nonoriginalist critiques, the
originalist’s position has become more and more plausible as a theory of constitutional
interpretation. . . . But the originalists have won a Pyrrhic victory. As originalism has been
clarified in response to its critics, it has gradually become more and more evident that it has no
force as a critique of the kind of constitutional interpretation practiced by the Warren Court.
Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism as Transformative Politics, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1599, 1601–02 (1989).
Solum’s point appears to differ to a degree from Chemerinsky’s (and mine). Solum explained: “When I
say plausible as a theory of constitutional interpretation, I mean that the most sophisticated forms of
originalism provide an accurate description of the phenomenology of constitutional practice.” Id. at
1601. That is to say, they are more descriptively plausible than their predecessors, not normatively more
defensible. And when he was referring to the potential for sophisticated originalism to yield a Warren
Court-type jurisprudence, Solum was seemingly highlighting its ability to transform the status quo by
appealing all the way back to first principles, see id. at 1627–29, rather than its open-ended potential to
allow judges to follow contemporary (or personal) moral values.
187. Chemerinsky, supra note 157, at 93.
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A. THE INEVITABLE MARRIAGE OF SOPHISTICATION AND FLEXIBILITY

The Old Originalism promised a distinctive method of constitutional interpretation that could constrain judges and prevent them from infusing the process of
constitutional adjudication with their personal morals and value preferences.188
As Keith Whittington explains: The Old “[O]riginalism was thought to limit the
discretion of the judge.”189 Old Originalists “repeatedly argued” that “the
central problem of constitutional theory was how to prevent judges from acting
as legislators and substituting their own substantive political preferences and
values for those of the people and their elected representatives.”190 They
proffered originalism as the solution. “The ‘political seduction of the law’ was a
constant threat in a system that armed judges with the powerful weapon of
judicial review, and the best response to that threat was to lash judges to the
solid mast of history.”191 “Originalist methods of constitutional interpretation
were understood as a means to that end.”192
It was the critics of originalism who advanced interpretive theories that
advocated broader levels of generality, and thus, afforded flexibility to the
courts. Ronald Dworkin, for instance, advocated a “moral reading” of the
Constitution that, as explained by James Fleming, holds that “the Constitution
embodies abstract moral principles rather than laying down particular historical
conceptions, and interpreting and applying those principles require fresh judgments of political theory about how they are best understood.”193 Cass Sunstein
similarly argued that a “valuable” way to interpret the Constitution would be to
“take the Framers’ understanding at a certain level of abstraction or generality.”194 And Justice Brennan favored “ascertaining and applying the broad
principles and values embodied in the general . . . words” of the Bill of Rights.195
The Old Originalism’s very raison d’être was to reject this sort of general
approach. That is what originalism initially was: an interpretive theory that was
different from the others in precisely this way—in its refusal to cede wiggle

188. See supra notes 7–21 and accompanying text.
189. Whittington, supra note 1, at 602.
190. Id.
191. Id. (quoting BORK, supra note 15, at 240).
192. Whittington, supra note 1, at 602; see also Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88
TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009) (“For the last quarter-century, originalism has been the idiom of judicial
restraint in the United States.”).
193. James E. Fleming, Judicial Review Without Judicial Supremacy: Taking the Constitution
Seriously Outside the Courts, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1377, 1381 (2005); see also DWORKIN, supra note
73, at 7 (“Many [constitutional] clauses are drafted in exceedingly abstract moral language. . . .
According to the moral reading, these clauses must be understood in the way their language most
naturally suggests: they refer to abstract moral principles and incorporate these by reference, as limits
on government’s power.”).
194. Sunstein, supra note 88, at 313.
195. William J. Brennan, Jr., Foreword: Neither Victims nor Executioners, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1, 7 (1994) (referring specifically to the Eighth Amendment).
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room to judges in which they might impose their own moral values.196 Of
course, whether it could back up that promise in practice is another story. But at
least in theory, it offered concrete results. For instance, it squarely precluded
any claim that the Fourteenth Amendment could be read to protect abortion
rights because the Framers did not intend or expect such a result.197
It was generally understood that a reliance on the narrow expectations of the
Framers was the very essence of originalism—its core commitment and defining characteristic, its claim to fame, its selling point.198 Indeed, that conception
became so ingrained in legal theory circles that “a surprising number of . . . smart
and careful scholars” who are critical of originalism continue, even today, to
conceive of originalism in these terms.199
But that is just not what originalism is anymore. Indeed, New Originalists
frequently deflect nonoriginalist critiques by accusing nonoriginalists of attacking a straw man: a long superceded version of originalism.200 Originalism—or
at least the originalism that fills the pages of law reviews—now allows judges to
render decisions that run contrary to the original intent and expectations of the
Framers201 and that are inconsistent with what the Framers thought or would
have thought about the issue.202 It now reads the most important rights-granting
clauses at broad levels of generality,203 thus affording judges substantial wiggle
room in which to engage in constitutional construction.204 Indeed, according to
several prominent New Originalists, originalism no longer even precludes a

196. Thus, originalists typically had extremely harsh words for theorists like Dworkin. See, e.g.,
BORK, supra note 15, at 176–77, 351–55; Raoul Berger, Ronald Dworkin’s The Moral Reading of the
Constitution: A Critique, 72 IND. L.J. 1099 passim (1997).
197. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 82, at 291–94; cf. Graglia, supra note 19, at 632–33 (calling the
argument for constitutional abortion rights “silly”).
198. See Solum, supra note 27, at 935 (citing CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELFGOVERNMENT 25–26 (2001)).
199. Berman, supra note 100, at 390 (citing KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
47–58 (2006), and Aileen Kavanagh, Original Intention, Enacted Text, and Constitutional Interpretation, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 255, 265 (2002)); see also Greene, supra note 25, at 663 (viewing original
expected application as an essential characteristic of the mainstream originalism that he seeks to
criticize and explore). Some scholars who are enamored of originalism also view original expected
application as essential to originalism. See, e.g., O’NEILL, supra note 7, at 178–79 (equating originalism
with a commitment to original expected application).
200. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 96, at 505 (“More often nowadays, however, Framers’ intent is
invoked by critics of originalism who either do not know they are attacking a straw man, or do not
care.”); Barnett, supra note 26, at 266 (charging that “some critics of originalism seek out its least
plausible version so as to reject originalism as unacceptable”); McConnell, supra note 75, at 1284–85
(“Dworkin’s refutation of specific intentionalism no more discredits originalism than a refutation of
Lamarck would discredit evolution.”); Paulsen, supra note 100, at 2059 (criticizing Jed Rubenfeld’s
“caricature of originalism”); Lawrence B. Solum, The Fourth Amendment in the Blogosphere &
Constitutional Theory, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Aug. 19, 2006, 1:59 PM), http://lsolum.typepad.com/
legaltheory/2006/08/the_fourth_amen.html.
201. See supra sections I.A & I.F.
202. See supra sections I.B & I.C.
203. See supra sections I.D & I.E.
204. See supra section I.G.
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court from protecting the right to an abortion.205
One might be tempted to speculate that what is really going on here is not
that originalism has fundamentally changed, but rather, that several former
nonoriginalists have jumped on the originalism bandwagon and have attempted
to co-opt the “originalist” label for their own decidedly nonoriginalist purposes.206 In other words, perhaps the New Originalism has not so much
replaced the Old Originalism as it has cynically stolen its limelight. But that is
not so. It is true that a few of the most vocal self-identified New Originalists
have pushed the theory further in the direction of admitted flexibility than most
other self-proclaimed originalists would be comfortable acknowledging.207 But
it is also true that (almost) no one is an Old Originalist anymore. It is now
nearly impossible to find an originalist who has not explicitly or implicitly
endorsed at least some of the theoretical moves discussed in Part I of this
Article.
Even Robert Bork—once the greatest of the Old Originalists—has come a
long way from where he started. Bork has now rejected original intent in favor
of original meaning,208 and he now endorses an originalism that relies on broad
principles rather than on narrow intents and expectations.209 Similarly, Justice
Scalia—“original meaning textualism’s patron saint”210—was the leader of the
“campaign to change the label from the Doctrine of Original Intent to the
Doctrine of Original Meaning,”211 and he has expressly repudiated reliance on
original expected application.212 And most of the academic originalists who
have followed in Justice Scalia’s footsteps have gone even further in refining
the theory than has Scalia.213 For instance, Michael McConnell, whom Keith
Whittington has called “undoubtedly the most prominent [N]ew [O]riginal-

205. See Balkin, supra note 82, at 291–94; Solum, supra note 27, at 970–71 (acknowledging the
possibility that abortion rights can be reconciled with originalism); see also Barnett, supra note 170, at
411, 415 (noting that he is “sympathetic with” Balkin’s conclusion that abortion rights are properly
grounded in originalism).
206. See Leib, supra note 4, at 355 (speculating that “many originalists will read Balkin to be a
living constitutionalist in disguise—and may not let him into their club”); Lund, supra note 176, at
1371–72 (criticizing Balkin’s theory and pressing the need “to distinguish genuinely originalist
interpretations from those that amount to living constitutionalism . . . dressed up in originalist clothing”).
207. For a discussion of this point, see infra Part V.
208. See BORK, supra note 15, at 144.
209. See id. at 162–63; James E. Fleming, The Balkanization of Originalism, 67 MD. L. REV. 10,
12–13 (2007) (noting that Bork’s claim that originalism seeks only a “major premise”—“a principle or
stated value”—suggests that even Bork “has made spectacular concessions to critics of originalism”
and has adopted a theory that relies on “elaborating abstract principles or values” rather than “discovering historical facts that are dispositive” (quoting BORK, supra note 15, at 162–63)).
210. Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 26, at 1139.
211. Scalia, supra note 36, at 106.
212. See Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW,
supra note 38, at 129, 144.
213. See supra note 27.
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ist,”214 has rejected original intent and original expected application,215 concluded that originalism allows for an evolving set of constitutional rights that
includes some that were not part of the original understanding,216 and acknowledged that originalism may not yield a single, correct interpretation, but rather,
a “legitimate range of interpretations.”217 These theories are not anomalous;
virtually every originalist has come at least a substantial way down the path
from the Old to the New.
Earlier in this Article, I asserted that originalists in the late 1980s were faced
with a choice—respect or constraint, but not both—and they chose respect.218
But perhaps calling it a “choice” is misleading. Originalists did not view it as a
choice at all. Rather, for all of the reasons discussed in Part I of this Article,
originalists came to the realization that a commitment to originalism—a commitment to the notion that the Constitution has a fixed meaning based on its
text—necessarily entails a commitment to the New Originalism rather than the
Old one. If originalism was to be a genuine intellectual theory and not simply
armchair political sloganeering camouflaged in the garb of constitutional interpretation, then it was inevitable that originalism would mature and refine itself as it
faced both criticism from smart opponents and self-reflection from smart proponents. The New Originalism is simply the inevitable consequence of that
maturation.219 Again, that is not to say that every originalist has taken every
conceptual step noted above or that every single one of those conceptual steps
was absolutely unavoidable. But it was inevitable that the mainstream of
originalist thought would flow very far indeed from where it all started.
B. THE PROFOUND FLEXIBILITY OF THE NEW ORIGINALISM

Some commentators have opined that the softening of originalism has essentially collapsed the distinction between originalism and nonoriginalism.220 This
214. Whittington, supra note 1, at 608.
215. See Michael W. McConnell, On Reading the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 359, 361–63
(1988) (rejecting original expected application and declaring that original intent can have the effect of
“subverting the rule of law”); McConnell, supra note 75, at 1284 (arguing that “no reputable originalist,
with the possible exception of Raoul Berger, takes the view that the Framers’ ‘assumptions and
expectation about the correct application’ of their principles is controlling” (quoting BORK, supra note
15, at 826)).
216. See McConnell, supra note 75, at 1292.
217. Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947,
1093 & n.729 (1995).
218. See supra notes 184–87 and accompanying text.
219. Cf. Balkin, supra note 78, at 443 (arguing that his theory is “the logical consequence[] of the
turn to original meaning”).
220. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 52, at 1087 (noting that originalists “who focus on the [F]ramers’
general principles . . . may be difficult to distinguish from non-originalists” (footnote omitted)); Fleming, supra note 209, at 12; Segall, supra note 166, at 432–33 (“This move from specific intentions to
general principles . . . eliminates any meaningful distinction between originalism and nonoriginalism . . . .”); Smith, supra note 5, at 10 (arguing that the New Originalism “threaten[s] to dissolve
originalism as a distinctive position by collapsing it into its long-time nemesis, the idea of the ‘living
Constitution’”).
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is true in some respects, but not in others. In practice, one cannot help but be
struck by the extent to which the New Originalism’s decision-making process
mirrors that of its nonoriginalist rivals; today’s originalists are engaging in the
same maneuvers that nonoriginalists have been practicing for decades. On the
ground, then, it is getting harder and harder to tell originalism and nonoriginalism apart. In theory, however, the New Originalism still differs from its
nonoriginalist rivals in important ways in terms of its understanding of constitutional meaning, constitutional legitimacy, and the proper role of the Judiciary in
our constitutional system.221 And yet, when it comes to the potential to constrain the Judiciary, and to produce objective, determinable right and wrong
answers to specific constitutional questions, originalism no longer offers any
appreciable advantage over nonoriginalism. Of course, in practice, the Old
Originalism could not actually produce much of an advantage either; but, in
theory, the Old Originalism could at least offer an advantage—it could promise
a way to avoid “the imposition of the judge’s merely personal values on the rest
of us.”222 The New Originalism, even in theory, has little to offer that differs
from its nonoriginalist rivals. The Old Originalism could not keep the promise
of constraint. The New Originalism cannot even make it.223
And yet, most New Originalists still do make that promise, at least to some
degree.224 Keith Whittington has explained that “[t]he [N]ew [O]riginalism is
less likely to emphasize a primary commitment to judicial restraint” than was
the Old Originalism.225 “The [N]ew [O]riginalism does not require judges to get

221. See, e.g., SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC
QUESTIONS 79–116 (2007) (arguing that Dworkin’s moral reading of the Constitution, which the authors
endorse, is meaningfully different from the theories advanced by originalists, whether they be “narrow
originalists,” “broad originalists,” or “[N]ew [O]riginalists”); Barnett, supra note 170, at 411–16
(suggesting theoretical differences between the New Originalism and nonoriginalism); Berman, supra
note 163, at 31 & n.79; Berman, supra note 163, at 66 (noting that nonoriginalism, at least in some
incarnations, does not posit that judges are constrained by a core fixed meaning, even one at a high
level of generality, but rather, that judges are constrained by “the argumentative norms of a culture and
of a practice” (footnote omitted)); Leib, supra note 4, at 357–58 (arguing that, even in its most
open-ended form, the New Originalism is fundamentally different from living constitutionalism because it continues to accord dispositive authority to history).
222. Robert H. Bork, Styles in Constitutional Theory, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 383, 387 (1985); see, e.g.,
Graglia, supra note 19, at 632 (insisting that “as a practical matter we almost always know all that we
need to know about the Constitution to decide actual cases” with the Old Originalism).
223. Cf. Berman, supra note 100, at 388 n.26 (noting that reading original meaning at high level of
generality “sacrifice[s] originalism’s pretensions to serious historical inquiry and its promise to impose
meaningful constraints on judges”); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 432 n.25
(1997) (making a similar observation); Smith, supra note 5, at 11–12 (noting that Jack Balkin’s version
of originalism sacrifices the claim to judicial constraint and the ability to criticize the Warren Court).
224. See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis: Two Case Studies of
Consistency and Coherence in Supreme Court Decision Making, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 217, 237
(2010) (arguing that “originalism promises to constrain constitutional interpretation”); Stephen J.
Markman, An Interpretivist Judge and the Media, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 149, 153 (2009).
225. Whittington, supra note 1, at 608. The Old Originalism, by contrast, admitted to being
“primarily a philosophy of judicial restraint.” Maltz, supra note 20, at 793; see also Whittington, supra
note 1, at 602 (“The primary commitment . . . was to judicial constraint.”).
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out of the way of legislatures. It requires judges to uphold the original Constitution—nothing more, but also nothing less.”226 Still, although originalism in its
New incarnation no longer emphasizes judicial restraint—in the sense of
deference to legislative majorities—it continues to a substantial degree to
emphasize judicial constraint—in the sense of promising to narrow the discretion of judges. New Originalists believe that the courts should sometimes be
quite active in preserving (or restoring) the original constitutional meaning, but
they do not believe that the courts are unconstrained in that activism. They are
constrained by their obligation to remain faithful to the original meaning.
Indeed, Judge Douglas Ginsburg has argued that “originalism has become
more constraining as originalist methodology has become more objective over
time.”227 Whereas the Old Originalism “was bootless because the subjectivity
of ‘intent’ made it malleable,” under the New Originalism, “the historical search
has become refined and objectified,” such that “the search through historical
materials will become ever less discretionary for the Justices.”228 Accordingly,
even more than its predecessor, the New “[O]riginalism actually is constraining” and “narrows and often blocks the self-directed path of the courts.”229
Admittedly, Judge Ginsburg is unusually aggressive in this claim. Whittington is likely correct when he asserts that, in recent originalist writing, “there
seems to be less emphasis on the capacity of originalism to limit the discretion
of the judge,” and that the “[N]ew [O]riginalist is . . . unlikely to argue that only
originalist methodology can prevent judicial abuses or can eliminate the need
for judicial judgment.”230 But that does not mean that New Originalists have
entirely abandoned the constraint promise.231 It just means that they have
qualified it. New Originalists tend to argue that, although their theory does not
completely eliminate judicial subjectivity and the potential for judicial mischief,
it is still meaningfully constraining, at least in comparison to the alternatives.232

226. Whittington, supra note 1, at 609; see also Griffin, supra note 23, at 1189 (noting that the New
Originalism “implies that judges must stand ready to be ‘activist’—to strike down legislation inconsistent with the [original meaning] when necessary”).
227. Ginsburg, supra note 224 (emphasis added).
228. Id.
229. Id. at 236–37.
230. Whittington, supra note 1, at 608–09; see also Berman, supra note 163, at 8 (noting that the
promise of mechanical constraint “is a fable to which few academic originalists subscribe; indeed,
many have denounced it”).
231. One exception might be John Harrison, who has recently penned an especially thoughtful essay
that expresses serious reservations about the constraining power of originalism in any form. See John
Harrison, On the Hypotheses that Lie at the Foundations of Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
473, 473–74 (2008).
232. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 15, at 163–64 (“In . . . its vindication of democracy against
unprincipled judicial activism, the philosophy of original understanding does better by far than any
other theory of constitutional adjudication can.”); Macey, supra note 139, at 302, 304 (arguing that
“originalism is not nearly so determinate as its most vocal proponents would suggest,” but claiming that
“originalism is defensible not because it restrains judges completely, or even well, but because it
restrains judges better than alternative methods of judging”); Paulsen, supra note 100, at 2061 (arguing
that imperfect constraint “is likely a less severe problem for originalism than for less-disciplined
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But is it really? How can a theory that interprets the most contentious
constitutional clauses at a very high level of abstraction claim to be any more
constraining than other methods of constitutional interpretation? According to
New Originalists, their theory promises constraint relative to nonoriginalism in
three ways.
First, New Originalist constitutional interpretation remains a historical inquiry. A judge is not permitted to give the Constitution any reading that the text
would, in the abstract, objectively bear. Instead, she is limited only to readings
that reasonable observers would have understood at the time of adoption.233
Thus, for example, the Domestic Violence Clause provides: “The United
States . . . shall protect each [State] against Invasion; and on Application of the
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened)
against domestic Violence.”234 Although the words “domestic violence” are
often used today to refer to physical assaults between persons living in the same
household, they were understood in 1787 to refer to an entirely different
concept: riots or civil unrest.235 Because the New Originalism requires judges to
read this clause in its historical context, it would not allow them to interpret this
provision to mandate that the federal government must agree to fund a state’s
spousal abuse prevention program.236 Nor would the New Originalism allow an
enterprising judge to interpret the Second Amendment’s right to “bear Arms”237
to protect “no more than an entitlement to possess the stuffed forelimbs of
grizzlies and Kodiaks.”238
Second, even when a New Originalist judge interprets a constitutional guarantee at a high level of generality and appeals to the broad principles that underlie
it, she can never use those principles to contradict the text itself.239 “When you

nonoriginalist approaches”); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863
(1989) (arguing that originalism is “less likely to aggravate the most significant weakness of the system
of judicial review”—that is, that “the judges will mistake their own predilections for the law”); cf.
WHITTINGTON, supra note 44, at 89–99, 204–06; Balkin, supra note 82, at 307–11.
233. See Balkin, supra note 78, at 488–89, 492–93; Barnett, supra note 170, at 411 (claiming that
“originalism properly done requires careful attention to evidence; it is not enough that a particular
interpretation is a plausible fit with the text”), Primus, supra note 160, at 187 (noting that “a pure
textualist can interpret and apply a legal provision without knowing when it was adopted or anything
else about the circumstances of its enactment, but a pure originalist cannot”).
234. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
235. See Balkin, supra note 78, at 430.
236. See id.; Solum, supra note 27, at 945–46.
237. U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State,
the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”).
238. Akhil Reed Amar, Rethinking Originalism: Original Intent for Liberals (and for Conservatives
and Moderates, Too), SLATE (Sept. 21, 2005, 12:36 PM), http://www.slate.com/toolbar.aspx?action⫽
print&id⫽2126680 (“As I see it, text without context is empty. Constitutional interpretation heedless of
enactment history becomes a pun-game: The right to ‘bear arms’ could mean no more than an
entitlement to possess the stuffed forelimbs of grizzlies and Kodiaks.”); see also Barnett, supra note 70,
at 20 (explaining that only historical inquiry can tell us whether the Second Amendment refers to
weapons or limbs).
239. See Barnett, supra note 170, at 412–13; Solum, supra note 27, at 959.
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need to penetrate beneath the surface of the text to the principles that lie
underneath, you must reemerge through the text.”240
Third, New Originalists argue that their methodology constrains because,
even if it does not dictate a single rule of law, it narrows the field of possible
contenders. The objective historical inquiry can rule out meanings that would
not have been viable at the time of the framing.241 “[W]hen the original
public meaning of a term or provision in a written constitution fails to provide a
unique rule of law to apply to a particular case, it still provides a ‘frame’
that . . . exclud[es] many possibilities . . . .”242
In theory, these limitations appear compelling, but in reality, none of them
ends up amounting to much of anything of substance. Nobody would read the
Second Amendment to guarantee the right to own stuffed animal limbs, and
nobody would read the Domestic Violence Clause to apply to spousal abuse.243
All constitutional theorists, even those who aggressively eschew the label of
“originalist,” genuinely respect history and original meaning, at least to some
degree.244 Modern theorists disagree about the category of weapons that fall
within the constitutional notion of “Arms,” and they disagree about the nature
of the “right” to bear them, but they do not dispute that the Second Amendment
is about weapons rather than forelimbs. Nor do they interpret the Domestic
Violence Clause to apply to spousal abuse, or Article IV’s promise that the
“United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form
of Government”245 to justify the Supreme Court’s finding for the Republican
Party candidate in Bush v. Gore.246
Similarly, when it comes to constitutional interpretation, nobody appeals to
underlying principles in order to contradict the text. Nonoriginalists appeal to
underlying principles to determine the meaning or appropriate reach of the

240. Barnett, supra note 170, at 413.
241. See, e.g., Thomas B. McAffee, Originalism and Indeterminacy, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
429, 431 (1996).
242. Barnett, supra note 2, at 647; see also Ginsburg, supra note 224, at 237 (“By restricting the
acceptable bases of a decision, originalism limits the range of plausible outcomes.”); Paulsen, supra
note 100, at 2050 (arguing that “one may recognize that originalism sometimes does not dictate clear
answers but merely frames the legitimate bounds of disagreement”).
243. But see Mark S. Stein, The Domestic Violence Clause in “New Originalist” Theory, 37
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 129, 133–35 (2009) (offering a clever argument that perhaps the New Originalism itself would allow such a reading).
244. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 52, at 1086; James E. Fleming, Response, Original Meaning
Without Originalism, 85 GEO. L.J. 1849, 1856 (1997); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 880–81 (1996).
245. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
246. 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Legal Historicism and Legal
Academics: The Roles of Law Professors in the Wake of Bush v. Gore, 90 GEO. L.J. 173, 179 (2001)
(noting that all lawyers from across the political spectrum would reject such an argument as “a mere
play on words and would conclude that such an argument is simply not within the realm of current
possibility”); see also Greene, supra note 192, at 8–9 (“If, by fortuity, the word ‘Senator’ comes in a
later age to mean ‘sandwich,’ each state is not thereby entitled to two free lunches. Unless, that is, we
are not interested in constitutional fidelity.”).
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indeterminate text, not to justify defying it.247 The example that New Originalists like to give here is, again, the Second Amendment. They suggest that a
nonoriginalist might identify the principle underlying the Second Amendment
as the maintenance of public safety to conclude that in today’s world, guns
actually undermine public safety, and thus, can be banned without violating the
Constitution.248 Alternatively, New Originalists suggest, a nonoriginalist might
read the Amendment’s preamble to indicate that the underlying purpose of the
Amendment was to preserve the militia to conclude that because we no longer
have a militia, we should deny any effect to the Amendment.249 But those who
reject the view that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to
possess firearms for self defense do not generally offer these arguments. Instead, they argue that because the “right to bear Arms” is vague or ambiguous,
the preamble should be sensibly used to ascertain the principles that underlie the
amendment, in order to determine the scope of the right protected by the text.
That is to say, they use the underlying principles to inform the inquiry into the
meaning of the text, not to supersede it.250
In other words, originalists manufacture conflict when they charge that the
“term ‘living constitution’ . . . was coined to justify ignoring or contradicting
the text in favor of applying the principles allegedly underlying the text to new
facts and changing circumstances.”251 Instead, that term is generally used to
justify using the text’s underlying principles to give the indeterminate text a
meaning (or if you prefer, construction) that is suitable for modern circum247. Thus, when Michael Stokes Paulsen seeks to parody nonoriginalist thinking with an article
suggesting that in the modern era of longer life expectancies, the principle underlying the constitutional
requirement that the President be at least thirty-five years of age would justify a rule that the President
must be at least fifty-nine and half, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Is Bill Clinton Unconstitutional? The
Case for President Strom Thurmond, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 217, 219–20 (1996), he engages in a form of
argument that no reputable nonoriginalist would endorse.
248. See Barnett, supra note 170, at 413
249. See id.
250. Thus, Justice Stevens began his Heller dissent as follows:
The question presented by this case is not whether the Second Amendment protects a
“collective right” or an “individual right.” Surely it protects a right that can be enforced by
individuals. But a conclusion that the Second Amendment protects an individual right does not
tell us anything about the scope of that right.
Guns are used to hunt, for self-defense, to commit crimes, for sporting activities, and to
perform military duties. The Second Amendment plainly does not protect the right to use a
gun to rob a bank; it is equally clear that it does encompass the right to use weapons for
certain military purposes. Whether it also protects the right to possess and use guns for
nonmilitary purposes like hunting and personal self-defense is the question presented by this
case. The text of the Amendment, its history, and our decision in United States v. Miller
provide a clear answer to that question.
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Even those who interpret the Amendment, in light of its preamble, to protect a collective right, rather
than an individual one, are not seeking to ignore or override the text; they are seeking to define the right
protected by the text. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Op-Ed, Staring Down the Barrel, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 2,
2007, at E9.
251. Barnett, supra note 170, at 414.
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stances, not to justify ignoring or contradicting the text in order to apply its
underlying principles to new facts and changing circumstances. As Justice
Brennan put it, a judge should “look to the history of the time of the framing” in
order to ascertain the underlying principles, with an eye toward ultimately
determining what “the words of the text mean in our time.”252 “For the genius of
the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a world that
is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with
current problems and current needs.”253
Finally, in practice, there is very little to the claim that originalism, even in its
softened form, at least narrows the field of possible outcomes more than its
competition does. Consider the following argument in favor of originalism:
“The precise original meaning of the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause, for example,
might be difficult to determine, but at the very least we should be able to agree
that the clause is limited to process, and does not entitle courts to conduct a
substantive review of the wisdom of legislation.”254 Not so. Even if we limit
ourselves to an inquiry into the objective, original public meaning of the text,
we cannot all agree on that proposition. The concept of substantive due process
was well-known at the time of the framing of the Due Process Clauses, and a
hypothetical, well-informed, reasonable observer would likely have been aware
of that.255 The New Originalism may not mandate the recognition of substantive
due process—and it surely does not mandate the particular applications of that
doctrine that the Supreme Court has endorsed—but nor does it preclude them.256

252. Brennan, supra note 145, at 438 (emphasis added).
253. Id. To be fair, credit for coining the term “living constitutionalism” is generally given to
Thomas Grey, who did advocate a theory that found constitutional meaning beyond the four corners of
the text. See Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 706
(1975) (“Where the broader view of judicial review diverges from the pure interpretive model is in its
acceptance of the courts’ additional role as the expounder of basic national ideals of individual liberty
and fair treatment, even when the content of these ideals is not expressed as a matter of positive law in
the written Constitution.”). That theory might be viewed uncharitably as a warrant for ignoring the text.
Originalists, though, should be careful not to cast stones in this regard because they too often endorse
structural arguments that are not clearly grounded in constitutional text. See Colby & Smith, supra note
24, at 292–94 (discussing Justice Scalia’s approach to constitutional interpretation). A better way to
view it might be as a warrant for supplementing the text. But either way, it is not a warrant for
contradicting the text. And in any event, Grey’s understanding of living constitutionalism as noninterpretivism has been abandoned by nonoriginalists on the ground that “it is difficult to imagine any judge or
scholar in the United States who does not claim that his or her constitutional opinions are in some sense
interpretations of the Constitution. The current debate is over how, not whether, to interpret it.” Powell,
supra note 103, at 659 n.1.
254. OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra note 13, at 7–8.
255. See Berman, supra note 163, at 22 n.51; Conkle, supra note 176, at 36; Frederick Mark
Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585, 668–70 (2009) (offering a detailed account of
substantive due process as being fully consistent with a careful application of public meaning
originalism); cf. John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV.
493, 542–55 (1997) (noting that the historical evidence regarding the propriety of substantive due
process is not clear cut).
256. See supra section I.G.
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It does not narrow the field of possible outcomes.
I do not mean to suggest that a method of interpretation that seeks a text’s
original public meaning is inherently unconstraining. Such a methodology could
indeed prove quite determinative when applied to a wide variety of documents.
It could even be meaningfully constraining as a method of constitutional
interpretation, if we had a different constitution. But it is not so with ours.
This point can be illustrated by reference to Gary Lawson’s clever analogizing of the Constitution to an eighteenth-century recipe for fried chicken.257
Lawson imagines:
Suppose that we find a document hidden in an old house. The document
appears to be written in English, and both linguistic analysis and scientific
dating techniques indicate that the document was produced in the lateeighteenth century in the area commonly known as Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The document lists quantities of items such as “one 2 1/2 pound chicken,”
“1/4 cup of flour,” “one teaspoon of salt,” “plenty of lard for frying,” and
“pepper to taste.” It also contains instructions for combining and manipulating
those items, such as “combine the one teaspoon of salt with the 1/4 cup of
flour,” “add pepper to taste to the salt and flour mixture,” “coat the chicken
with the flour,” and “fry the coated chicken in hot lard until golden brown.”
The document, in other words, appears to be a late-eighteenth-century recipe
for preparing fried chicken.258

What, asks Lawson, does this document mean? We know from our general
cultural knowledge that recipes are instructions designed to achieve particular
goals, and we know that, generally speaking, they are intended to be read and
followed by persons other than the author. It thus follows that the meaning of
the recipe is its original public meaning: “the meaning that it would have to the
audience to which [it] addresses itself”259—people in the late eighteenth century
who might be interested in how to make fried chicken.260
Lawson then asks us to suppose that years later “cooks began to depart from
the recipe in significant ways. For instance, cooks today might overwhelmingly
substitute rosemary for pepper because that is what current consumers seem to
prefer.” Does that change the meaning of the recipe? Of course not, says
Lawson: “The recipe says ‘pepper,’ and if modern cooks use rosemary instead,
they are not interpreting the original recipe, but rather they are amending
it—perhaps for the better, but amending it nonetheless.”261 Things might be
different if the recipe said something like “add seasonings to taste.” If that were
so, the choice to use rosemary rather than pepper would be perfectly consistent

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

See supra notes 129–34 and accompanying text.
Lawson, supra note 129, at 1825.
Id. at 1826.
See id.
Id. at 1830.
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with the original meaning of the recipe, which was to grant discretion to the
cook to choose the seasonings that the cook finds most tasty. But this recipe
specifically said “pepper,” and thus, the substitution of rosemary was a deviation from its meaning.262
Bringing the point home, Lawson declares that “[t]he Constitution of the
United States is a recipe—a recipe for a particular form of government.”263 As
such, its meaning is also its original public meaning, and when judges deviate
from that meaning—even in desirable ways—they are amending the Constitution, not interpreting it.264
We can agree with everything that Lawson says, however, and still not end up
with a meaningfully constrained Judiciary. To be sure, there are provisions in
the Constitution that are somewhat recipe-like in their precision. For example,
when Article I, Section 3 says that the Senate shall consist of two Senators from
each state, that means we cannot choose one or three, even though some states
are now so much larger than others that it seems unfair and undemocratic not to
make some changes.265 We are constrained by the original meaning. But
precisely because they are so clear and unambiguous, these were not the sorts of
constitutional provisions that provided the impetus for the originalist movement. Originalism was born primarily of a desire to constrain judicial interpretation of the Constitution’s rights-bearing provisions—principally the Bill of
Rights and the various clauses of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.266
Those provisions look nothing at all like a typical recipe.267
If the Equal Protection Clause were like Lawson’s fried chicken recipe, it
would go on for several pages, perhaps beginning with something along these
lines:
No state shall discriminate on the basis of race, gender, physical or mental
disability, sexual orientation, or national origin, in the provision of education,
welfare entitlements, access to the legal system, or public accommodations, or
in the scope or enforcement of laws, regulations, or other governmental
policies or practices, whether written or unwritten, except when necessary in
order to serve a compelling public interest in health, safety, diversity, or
national security. Laws that legislate facially along racial lines, or that were
enacted out of a desire to harm members of a particular race, shall be

262.
263.
264.
265.

See id. at 1830–31.
Id. at 1833.
See id. at 1830, 1833–34.
See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES
WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 49–62 (2006) (critiquing this rule as fundamentally
undemocratic).
266. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 15, at 17–18, 129, 351–53; Graglia, supra note 19, at 632–35;
Greene, supra note 25, at 679–81; Powell, supra note 103, at 696–97.
267. Nor do they look like a “blueprint for a machine,” Barnett, supra note 88, at 407, or “an
instruction manual,” Lawson & Seidman, supra note 58, at 52—two other analogies offered by New
Originalists. See also Bennett, supra note 172, at 672 (noting that “the Constitution is not in many of its
provisions anything like an instruction manual”).
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considered “discriminatory,” but laws that are facially neutral and were not
born of a discriminatory intent shall not be considered “discriminatory” even
if they have a disparate impact on particular races. Furthermore, . . .

But the Equal Protection Clause does not read anything like that. It says
simply: “No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.”268 If we were to try to analogize it to a chicken recipe, it
would have to be a recipe that reads, in its entirety, something like this:
“Prepare and season chicken until tasty.” How should we cook the chicken?
What seasonings should we use? The recipe—such as it is—does not say.
If we were to bind ourselves to the original intentions or expectations of the
author (or authors) of this recipe, we might be able to determine a more
particularized set of cooking instructions, depending on the available evidence
about the recipe’s author (or authors).269 But if we disavow those intentions and
expectations, and look instead to the objective meaning of the recipe, then we
have little with which to work. We can agree that the recipe’s true “meaning” is
its original public meaning. And we can decide to follow its original public
meaning. But we still do not know how to make dinner. The recipe is not
particularly constraining. We could make the sort of fried chicken that its
authors might have had in mind. Or we could make a more modern fried
chicken with eleven herbs and spices. Or we could make Buffalo Wings,
Tandoori Chicken, Chicken Cordon Bleu, or a thousand other tasty chicken
dishes. We could make any of those things while still complying with the
recipe.270

268. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
269. However, we would probably find that the reason the recipe was written in such capacious
terms was that it had to be agreed upon by a very large number of people, each of whom had quite
different ideas about how to cook chicken. Perhaps it was written by a convention of chefs who were
tasked with designing a chicken recipe that would command unanimous approval as the single best way
to make chicken. The only way to get all of those disparate, strong-willed cooking professionals to
agree was to make the recipe so open-ended that it could be read to allow or reflect each of their
preferred methods. See infra note 284 and accompanying text.
270. If I may indulge this silly thought experiment just a moment longer, it can help to illustrate the
ways in which the New Originalism mitigates (though does not obviate) the dead-hand problem, but
does so at the expense of constraint. Let us imagine that the Constitution does contain a broad mandate
to cook tasty chicken. If we were to interpret that mandate according to the intent and expectations of
the Framers—if we were to treat this broad recipe as in fact requiring us to cook chicken in precisely
the way that the Framers intended or expected—then, even if we could satisfy ourselves as to just what
it is that the Framers intended and expected, we would have to wrestle with some very difficult
questions. Why should men who have been dead for two centuries get to control what we have for
dinner today? Maybe back in the 1780s, everybody loved fried chicken, but that is because fried
chicken was all that they knew. After more than a century of immigration and culinary innovation, we
now have many more tasty options to choose from: Teriyaki Chicken; Chicken Satay; Chicken Gyros;
et cetera. Why should we be denied all of that delicious food because the white, Anglo-Saxon,
culinarily challenged Framers liked their chicken bland? And what about health issues? The Framers
did not know about cholesterol. The recipe that they intended poses serious health risks that they could
never have anticipated. If we were allowed to appeal to the recipe’s underlying principles, we might be
able to get away with swapping the lard for a healthier, cholesterol-free alternative, but an original
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This same point can be made in an equally fanciful, but perhaps slightly more
helpful, manner by imagining that we have in our house not an old recipe for
chicken, but rather an old home-spun embroidery that reads: “Family Rule: Be a
Good Parent.” If we read this rule as an Old Originalist would, we might
conceivably find ourselves to be meaningfully (and probably stiflingly) constrained by eighteenth-century notions of good parenting. An Old Originalist
would seek to determine which particular forms of treatment, punishment, and
the like, were approved of by those who stitched the embroidery.271 But if we
read the rule as a New Originalist would, we would find that it does nothing to
cabin us as we make difficult child-rearing decisions. There are today—just as
there were centuries ago—many conceptions of the “good,” and the text affords
no basis for choosing among them. The objective textual meaning is not going
to be of much use in determining whether mommy broke the family rule by
failing to bring home expensive souvenirs for the kids from her last business
trip, or by refusing to cook an alternate vegetable for little Jimmy, who hates
broccoli. Either of these activities can be defended as good parenting or
condemned as bad parenting, depending on one’s personal views of child
rearing. There are many different schools of parenting that can all lay claim to
conformance with the open-ended family rule.272 Any effort to enforce the rule
and make concrete determinations in these situations would necessarily amount
to the imposition of the personal values of the person charged with the enforcement authority.
With respect to its key rights provisions, the Constitution resembles this
family rule much more than it does Lawson’s recipe for fried chicken. Because
it speaks in “majestic generalities,”273 reading the Constitution’s words at the
level of generality that their language objectively suggests274 will yield an
abstract, flexible meaning.275 Thus, a great many possible rules of decision—
including many that contradict each other—would all be faithful to the original
meaning.276
intent or original expected application originalist would not permit such an appeal. New Originalist
interpretation, by contrast, would let us cook our chicken however we want, so long as it is tasty by our
standards today. That mitigates the dead-hand problem, but it fails to constrain modern chefs. (And it
does not, it should be noted, fully eliminate the dead-hand problem. Why should twenty-first century
vegetarians be forced to eat chicken because the Framers had no problem with killing and eating
animals?)
271. See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text.
272. Cf. supra notes 105–11 and accompanying text (discussing open-ended constitutional provisions).
273. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943); see also Balkin, supra note 71,
at 555 (referring to the “glittering generalities” of the Fourteenth Amendment).
274. See supra section I.E.
275. See, e.g., Gregory Bassham, Freedom’s Politics: A Review Essay of Ronald Dworkin’s Freedom
Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1235, 1239 (1997)
(book review) (noting that “the very generality and abstractness of the language naturally suggests a
broad rather than a narrow interpretation of these clauses”).
276. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 22, at 706 (noting that in hard cases “courts deal with conflicting
interpretations that are both consistent with the objective meaning of the text”); Primus, supra note 160,

760

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 99:713

Consider the examples of two controversial issues, one from the past and one
from the present: segregation and affirmative action. A commitment to the
original intentions or narrow expectations of the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment might (in theory anyway277) be sufficient to eliminate judicial
subjectivity from these divisive inquiries.278 So too, perhaps, could an intermediate form of originalism that looks to the actual, historical understanding of the
framing generation as the source of the proper level of generality at which to
determine constitutional meaning.279 Michael McConnell has found “some
degree of historical support” for a number of different conceptions of the
equality that was guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause: a “rule of strict
formal equality, requiring all citizens to be treated without regard to race or
other morally irrelevant distinctions”; a rule of “‘limited absolute equality’—
absolute equality of all citizens with respect to a limited category of rights (civil
rights, but not social or political rights)”; a prohibition against “class legislation” or “special legislation”; or a ban on “discrimination that partakes of
‘caste,’ something akin to modern anti-subordination theories.”280 In theory, an
originalist of this stripe could satisfy herself after extensive historical research
that one of these particular conceptions represents the one actually understood
by the American public in 1868, and she could apply that conception to the
problem of segregation or affirmative action to get a definitive answer.
A New Originalist, however, could not do so. A New Originalist would
recognize that the text of the Equal Protection Clause is objectively broader and
more abstract than any of these narrower (though still quite broad) conceptions

at 206–07 (arguing that Balkin’s version of originalism “permits any significant American interest
group” to claim fidelity to original meaning because “[w]ithin the compass of actually contested issues
that an official might have to decide, Balkin’s version of originalist reasoning could probably support
either side of the question.”).
277. But see McConnell, supra note 217 (seeking to demonstrate that the Framers narrowly
understood the Fourteenth Amendment to preclude segregation, but recognizing “that history sometimes reveals a ‘range of “original understandings”’ rather than a single answer” (quoting Powell, supra
note 103, at 690)).
278. See BERGER, supra note 14, at 117–18, 139–40 (discussing Alexander Bickel’s belief that the
Framers did not intend to forbid segregation and providing additional evidence that the Framers did not
have such an intent); Maltz, supra note 29, at 846 (citing sources to support the argument that “the
historical record indicates unambiguously that the Framers of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment did not
intend to outlaw state-imposed segregation per se”); Rubenfeld, supra note 223, at 429–32 (arguing that
race-conscious Reconstruction programs show that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
expect it to preclude affirmative action); Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 754–83 (1985) (same); supra notes 85–86 and
accompanying text (discussing segregation).
279. See, e.g., Lash, supra note 45, at 339–40 (“[H]istorical evidence also may allow us to conclude
that some core meanings were more likely shared by the general public . . . .); McConnell, supra note
47, at 1136 (“Originalism is the idea that the words of the Constitution must be understood as they were
understood by the ratifying public at the time of enactment.”).
280. McConnell, supra note 75, at 1282 (quoting EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION,
AND CONGRESS, 1863–1869, at 68, 157–58 (1990)) (citing John Harrison, Equality, Race Discrimination,
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 243 (1996)).
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of equality.281 And she would further recognize that the historical support for
each of these various conceptions of equality indicates that “equal protection of
the laws”282 was not a term of art with an objectively determinable narrow
meaning.283 Rather, all of these various conceptions of equality—definitions of
equal protection at a medium to high level of generality—are plausible fits with
the objective meaning of the text. The clause was written in terms so broad and
vague as to be textually capable of supporting all of these various (though often
mutually exclusive) principles. In fact, a New Originalist would likely determine that this was no accident. The Framers were probably forced to use such
lofty and ill-defined language in order to convince the various people who held
these numerous competing conceptions to go along with it.284 Or perhaps the
Framers voluntarily chose to use such broad language in order to ensure that the
abstract mandate of equality would continue to remain vital in an ever-changing
world.285 Indeed, perhaps they affirmatively wanted to vest subsequent genera-

281. Michael Dorf has noted that “the issue [of choosing one of these conceptions] is not one of
abstraction, per se,” because some of these conceptions are simultaneously both broader and narrower
than others—for example, color-blindness is narrower than antisubordination because it does not
condemn laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, but it is broader than antisubordination because it prohibits affirmative action. Michael C. Dorf, Truth, Justice, and the American
Constitution, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 133, 140 (1997) (book review). Thus, Dorf articulates the issue as a
choice among competing principles, not as a quest for the proper level of generality at which to view a
particular principle. See id. This is correct. My point here is that the text cannot be read to objectively
state a specific principle at some particular level of generality, but rather, must be read broadly to reflect
an abstract commitment that could be cashed out through a variety of different principles at various
levels of generality.
282. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
283. See Balkin, supra note 78, at 495 (noting that, given its broad text, this Clause should not be
read to reflect a particular conception of equality “[u]nless we have strong evidence that the term ‘equal
protection of the laws’ was a generally recognized term of art”).
284. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 61–63 (1955) (arguing that moderates and radicals intentionally chose open-ended language
so that the Fourteenth Amendment could be read to support a wide range of outcomes, and thus, could
appeal to a wide range of constituencies); cf. ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 67–69
(1992) (“Congress indicated that it preferred the more malleable notions of equality and ‘equal
protection’ . . . .”). Many originalists remain deeply hostile to this notion. Steven Smith explains:
In theory, to be sure, originalism is compatible with the possibility that the people might
simply incorporate some general principle into positive law and thereby authorize future
judges to enforce the principle as they come to understand it. But in fact it seems unlikely that
citizens and political actors would readily choose to make such an open-ended (and irresponsible?) decision. Thus, originalists are characteristically as resistant to such interpretations as
progressive non-originalists are enthusiastic.
Smith, supra note 4, at 6 n.18. This objection ignores, I believe, the political realities of legislating by
supermajority on controversial topics. I have previously argued that this is, in fact, a nearly universal
phenomenon when it comes to controversial constitutional provisions. See Colby, supra note 18, at 535,
590–95 (developing the point that “as a natural consequence of the constitution-making process, a
constitutional provision addressing a deeply controversial subject can only hope to be enacted when it
is drafted with highly [vague or] ambiguous language so that, rather than possessing a single [narrow]
original meaning, it appeals to disparate factions with divergent understandings of its terms.”).
285. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View
from the Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 313, 325–26 (1986) (“[O]ur Framers knew what they were doing.
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tions of judges with the power to determine which conception of equality to
enforce.286 Whatever the reason for the Framers’ actions, a fully informed and
educated, hypothetical, reasonable contemporary should be taken to have been
aware that various people viewed the Amendment as reflecting each of these
conceptions of equality. And she would have recognized that the text is abstract
enough to be consistent with each of them. As such, she would have concluded
that the text is objectively read to enact a broader principle still, one that can
encompass any of these competing medium- to high-level possibilities: an
abstract, unspecified, amorphous commitment to equality. Accordingly, its original meaning is consistent with both upholding and striking down segregation
and affirmative action, insofar as advocates on both sides of these issues have
made plausible arguments grounded in differing conceptions of equality. The
New Originalism does not constrain the judge on these contentious questions.287
And there is nothing unique about these particular issues. “Equal protection
of the laws” is no more abstract than “due process of law,”288 “privileges or
immunities,”289 “other rights,”290 “freedom of speech,”291 “free exercise of
religion,”292 and the like. “As all parties to a dispute become more able to
ground good arguments in original meaning, attention to original meaning can
do less and less to adjudicate the issue.”293

They were careful draftsmen. . . . [They] fully underst[ood] that this language was not specific and
could be interpreted in any number of ways, and this choice to employ a broad principle must be
similarly respected.”); Perry, supra note 57, at 112 (arguing that broad levels of generality that are
profoundly underdeterminate may be chosen because of a desire for the underlying values of constitutional rights to continue to have resonance in a changing world).
286. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 78, at 456 (“The [F]ramers of [S]ection 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment deliberately chose a text with fairly abstract principles and vague standards that would
delegate most issues to the future . . . .”); Berman, supra note 163, at 30–31 (noting this possibility and
observing that “if there are many such provisions (or even a small number of provisions that are
especially fertile as generators of litigation), then some of Originalism’s supposed benefits, such as its
constraining effect on judicial subjectivity . . . are likely to prove rather more modest than its proponents often claim”); Powell, supra note 103, at 670–71 (noting that there are many instances “in which
history indicates that the founders consciously chose to leave a question of constitutional meaning for
later interpreters”); Whittington, supra note 1, at 611 (noting the possibility “that the founders merely
meant to delegate discretion to future decisionmakers to act on a given subject matter with very little
guidance as to how that discretion should be used or on the substantive content of the principles on
which those decisionmakers should act”).
287. See Balkin, supra note 71, at 555, 600 (arguing that both Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896), and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), are consistent with the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment); Barnett, supra note 26, at 260, 265–66 (arguing that the Old
Originalism possibly allowed only one answer to the segregation question, but the New Originalism
allows either answer because “separate but equal” is a constitutional construction, and therefore,
“[e]ven if it is consistent [with the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment], it can nevertheless
be rejected in favor of another construction that is also consistent with the original meaning”).
288. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V.
289. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1.
290. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
291. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
292. See id.
293. Primus, supra note 160, at 207.
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As such, the difficult work of deciding cases will have to be done by what the
New Originalists call constitutional construction—the act of choosing a rule of
decision when the original meaning is capable of supporting multiple rules.294
As Jack Balkin puts it: “[O]riginalism does not dictate the results of constitutional construction, and for a very large number of disputed cases, construction
is the name of the game.”295 A New Originalist can thus, as Randy Barnett
explains, “take the abstract meaning as a given, and accept that the application
of this vague meaning to particular cases is left to future actors, including
judges, to decide.”296 Originalism is accordingly not particularly constraining
on the judge.297 Balkin confesses that the Constitution’s original meaning “will
not be sufficient to decide a wide range of controversies and so judges will have
to engage in considerable constitutional construction . . . . Hence fidelity to
original meaning cannot constrain judicial behavior all by itself.”298

294. See supra section I.G.
295. Balkin, supra note 71, at 604–05.
296. Barnett, supra note 26, at 264; see also id. (arguing that “the Constitution includes more
open-ended or abstract provisions, and thereby delegates discretion to judges”). A number of New
Originalists do not believe that judges should be permitted to engage in constitutional construction. See
infra section V.A.
297. Richard Kay has recently argued that “original public meaning interpretation, in the hands of
less careful or rigorous judges, leads to an enlarged range of plausible outcomes, threatening to subvert
the clarity and stability of constitutional meaning that is central to the constitutionalist enterprise.” Kay,
supra note 22, at 704. Kay’s argument (which he offers as a reason to return to something more like the
Old Originalism) is that “public meaning originalism will generate more cases of constitutional
indeterminacy than will the originalism of original intentions.” Id. at 721. This is so, he says, because it
is impossible for a New Originalist judge to determine the proper “objective” level of generality at
which to interpret a constitutional provision. A quest for the actual intentions of actual people can yield
actual correct answers; a quest for the hypothetical views of a hypothetical reasonable person is likely
to simply yield the view that the judge herself thinks of as most reasonable. See id. at 722–23; see also
Conkle, supra note 176, at 37 (arguing that New Originalists can disagree about the proper level of
generality, which “highlights the weakness of originalism in providing objective standards that can
control the discretion of the Court”). There is much to be said for this argument, which differs from the
one that I am making here. Kay’s view is that the New Originalism produces indeterminacy “in the
hands of less careful or less rigorous judges.” Kay, supra note 22, at 704. He continues: “I do not mean,
of course, that adoption of the original public meaning approach necessarily leads to this elastic kind of
constitutional interpretation. But relying on an artificial concept instead of on an actual historical event
inevitably enlarges the field of such imaginative reconstructions.” Id. at 725. My point is that the New
Originalism does “necessarily lead[] to this elastic kind of constitutional interpretation,” id., even in the
hands of careful and rigorous judges, because, objectively, the Constitution’s primary rights-granting
provisions reflect a very high level of generality.
298. Balkin, supra note 71, at 551; see Balkin, supra note 71, at 557 (arguing that the New
Originalism “does not preclude us from a wide range of possible future constitutional constructions”);
see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document and the
Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 28 (2000) (“Granted, even after close study the document itself will
often be indeterminate over a wide range of potential applications. Within this range, judicial doctrine
can work alongside practical resolutions achieved by other branches to specify particular outcomes and
thereby concretize the Constitution.”); Barnett, supra note 26, at 265 (noting that it is “quite common”
for there to be multiple competing constructions available to the judge); Perry, supra note 57, at
105–06, 115–53 (defending a version of the New Originalism dictating that because the original
meaning is often quite abstract and indeterminate, judges can be committed originalists and still impose
their own views of the best way to implement the Constitution’s broad rights provisions). Lawrence
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Fidelity to original meaning would thus not have prohibited the Warren and
Burger Courts from issuing the decisions that were the initial impetus for
originalism in the first place.299 And it might even authorize judges to go further
still. According to Randy Barnett: “[T]he original meanings of the Ninth
Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause offer far more justifiable
and robust protection of personal liberty, for example, than do current approaches based on the Due Process [C]lauses.”300
The New Originalism is thus no more constraining than other theories of
constitutional interpretation. And it may even be less constraining. Some nonoriginalist theories—common law constitutionalism and representation reinforcement come to mind—have their own constraining mechanisms that might well
place more effective limits on judicial whim than does the New Originalism.301
IV. OF SUBSTANCE AND SEMANTICS
As it has become more sophisticated (and less constraining), the New Originalism has developed a lexicon of its own, much of which is reflected throughout
this Article. There is nothing inherently wrong with that; it helps to be precise
when articulating complicated theoretical concepts, and developing a common

Solum concedes the possibility that open-ended clauses like the Privileges or Immunities Clause might
be “radically ambiguous,” necessitating construction within a very wide range. See Solum, supra note
27, at 967. And he concedes that, “[i]f originalist theory requires this result, then it might undermine
one of the normative justifications sometimes offered for originalism—that it constrains judicial
discretion and reinforces the rule of law.” Id. But he suggests the possibility that these clauses may not
be as radically ambiguous as they might first appear, because they might have been objectively
understood at the time as terms of art. Id. at 968. The Privileges or Immunities Clause, for instance,
might have been objectively understood as a commitment to a natural rights jurisprudence. See id. at
968–70. Even if that is so, however, it does little to constrain the Judiciary. See JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 14–30, 34–41, 48–54 (1980) (arguing against
reading the Constitution to allow judges to protect natural law rights on the ground that doing so would
place far too much unbridled power in the hands of unelected judges).
299. See Balkin, supra note 78, at 449 (claiming that the Fourteenth Amendment’s broad language
legitimizes the results in many major cases); Barnett, supra note 170, at 416 (“I share [Balkin’s] belief
that many, though not all, of the most cherished progressive results can be supported by a proper use of
this methodology.”); McConnell, supra note 75, at 1286 (claiming that his version of originalism would
recognize the constitutional right to contraception); Perry, supra note 47, at 710 (arguing that the
“modern constitutional decisions found most objectionable by Robert Bork and many others are, in the
main, consistent with an originalist approach to constitutional adjudication”); cf. Balkin, supra note 71,
at 559 (arguing that the welfare state and the civil rights revolution are “perfectly consistent” with
originalism because they are legitimate “exercises in constitutional construction”).
300. Barnett, supra note 70, at 21.
301. Cf. Conkle, supra note 176, at 39–43 (“[Nonoriginalism] honor[s] majoritarian self-government
and judicial objectivity to a considerable degree . . . .”); Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis
and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 277–82 (2005) (arguing that “a
strong theory of precedent—and a correspondingly reduced role for originalist reasoning—will result in
more judicial restraint”); Primus, supra note 160, at 214–15 (“[I]t would be extravagant to claim that
attention to original meanings alone would yield less discretionary decisionmaking than, say, a
jurisprudence that looked only at judicial precedents.”); Strauss, supra note 244, at 925–34 (arguing
that common law constitutionalism is “superior to its competitors” with respect to addressing concerns
with democracy and judicial constraint).
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vocabulary can assist in that process. But such a lexicon can be misleading to
outsiders—especially when it co-opts old terms and gives them new (or more
refined) definitions. This Part seeks to identify two instances in which that has
begun to happen with the New Originalism in ways that might obscure the
central argument made in this Article.
A. FIXED AND CHANGING MEANINGS

I and others have previously referred to competing readings of the scope or
mandate of constitutional provisions as different potential “meanings” of those
provisions to argue that the very existence of those competing readings at the
time of the framing indicates that there was no single original public meaning.302
This Article makes that same substantive point by employing different terminology. It argues that the existence of competing readings of the scope or
mandate of constitutional provisions indicates that the original shared or objective “meaning” of those provisions must have been extremely broad and thus
capable of being cashed out through any number of principles yielding any
number of doctrinal applications.
These are two ways of articulating essentially the same argument. The latter
just draws upon the rhetoric of the New Originalism, which relies on a different
sense of the word “meaning.”303 The first way of phrasing the argument uses the
word “meaning” as shorthand for the scope or mandate of the provision: the
legal rule, principle, or standard that it enacts.304 And it concludes that there is

302. See Colby, supra note 18, at 535 (arguing that a constitutional provision dealing with controversial rights can only hope to gain the necessary supermajority support to pass when it is drafted in vague
or ambiguous terms “so that, rather than possessing a single original meaning, it appeals to disparate
factions with divergent understandings of its terms”); see also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:
POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 6 (1996); Tushnet, supra note 176, at 610–11
(“History is replete with . . . ‘contested truths.’ These contests are precisely contests over conventional
meaning. That is, give me an interesting term used in a constitution, and I will find a bunch of people at
the time of its adoption who understood it to mean one thing, and a bunch of other people who
understood it to mean something else.” (footnote omitted)).
303. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 26, at 269 (“[O]riginal meaning can be determinate at a higher
level of generality, while the application of this meaning to particular objects is left to the discretion of
future decision makers.”). New Originalists have specifically discussed these different conceptions of
the meaning of “meaning.” See supra note 95.
304. In the days of the Old Originalism, theorists on both sides of the debate tended to speak of
constitutional “meaning” in this narrower sense—as a way of describing how the provision applies to
particular cases. Thus, Raoul Berger equated the proper “meaning” of the Constitution with the original
intent of the Framers as to its intended scope, BERGER, supra note 14, at 402, and labeled any decision
that deviated from the Framers’ narrow intent or expectations as inconsistent with the true meaning of
the Constitution. See id. at 403–04. Justice Brennan, by contrast, insisted on a very different “meaning”
of the Constitution, but one that also focused on how it applies to modern issues:
[T]he ultimate question must be: What do the words of the text mean in our time? For the
genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and
gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems and current needs.
Brennan, supra note 145, at 438.
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no original “meaning” because the provision could be read to enact many
different rules or principles, and thus, to have an undefined original mandate or
scope. The second way of phrasing the argument uses the word “meaning” more
broadly: It allows that a clause may have an original semantic “meaning” in the
sense that it reflects some sort of concept, but one that is so abstract as to be
unable to dictate a particular mandate or scope. Think of a political candidate
who promises “better government.” In the first sense, that promise is “meaningless” blather because it does not commit the candidate to any particular course
of action, nor does it offer any concrete proposals for improvement. In the
second sense, the promise has meaning, but it still fails to articulate actual
policy commitments.
It is too easy to get hung up in the semantics of this distinction—to fret over
the proper meaning of “meaning” in constitutional interpretation. As it relates to
the central thesis of this Article, nothing of substance turns on the way in which
we define “meaning,” and by extension, on the way in which we articulate the
basic point about the indeterminacy of originalism. When it comes to examining
the constraining power of originalism, there is no distinction between saying on
the one hand that there are multiple possible meanings rather than one single
original meaning of a provision, and saying on the other hand that the provision’s original meaning is open-ended enough to be consistent with a huge
number of possible rules, doctrines, and outcomes. Six of one, half dozen of the
other. Either way, originalism does not meaningfully constrain judges.
But confusion may result because New Originalists tend to speak of “meaning” in a sense other than the previously prevailing one. This can give the
appearance that we are all talking past one another when we are not; we are all
talking about the same thing in slightly different terms.
In effect, the New Originalism replaces an old objection—originalism is
impossible because there is no discoverable original meaning—with a new
one—originalism fails to constrain because the original meaning is too indeterminate to decide most contentious cases. As a matter of substance, the two
objections cover essentially the same ground. As a matter of theoretical legitimacy, however, there is a major difference between the two. The former
objection, if true, rendered the Old Originalism a fraud. The latter objection, if
true, does not defeat the New Originalism; it simply neutralizes its ability to
promise constraint. This, again, is the fundamental truth of originalism: it can
offer promise only through illegitimacy, or legitimacy only by foregoing promise. A necessary consequence of the theoretical sophistication of the New
Originalism is its sacrifice of judicial constraint.
B. INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION

Most judges and constitutional theorists have traditionally viewed the process
of fashioning constitutional doctrine and applying it to particular issues as a
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process of constitutional “interpretation.”305 The New Originalism, however,
distinguishes between constitutional “interpretation” and constitutional “construction,” and treats that process as a matter of construction, except perhaps where
the constitutional language is so specific as to support only one outcome.306
This distinction can be a useful one, and it makes sense on its own terms. But
it is not one that has generally been employed in our constitutional discourse.
Most constitutional theorists either subsume the activity that New Originalists
call “construction” within their definition of “interpretation,”307 or use the two
terms interchangeably.308 Thus, there is again great potential for confusion, or
for giving the impression that we are all talking past one another when we are
not. We sometimes have to “translate” prior cases or monographs before we can
relate them to the New Originalism. But when we do so, we can often find great
insight into the open-ended nature of the New Originalism.
Consider the notorious case of Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell,309 a
frequent object of scorn by originalists.310 Chief Justice Hughes’ opinion for the
Court, which upheld against a Contracts Clause311 challenge a state law that
temporarily prevented mortgage holders from foreclosing on mortgages during
the Great Depression, even though the Contracts Clause was apparently motivated by a desire to preclude precisely this sort of debtor relief legislation, has
often been treated as a paragon of nonoriginalism.312 But if we read Hughes’
language with an anachronistic, New Originalist eye to terminology, it actually
appears to be a paragon of the New Originalism rather than nonoriginalism:
When the provisions of the Constitution, in grant or restriction, are specific,
so particularized as not to admit of construction, no question is presented.
Thus, emergency would not permit a state to have more than two Senators in

305. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 496 (1996) (“[T]he same interest
that supports regulation of potentially misleading advertising, namely, the public’s interest in receiving
accurate commercial information, also supports an interpretation of the First Amendment that provides
constitutional protection for the dissemination of accurate and nonmisleading commercial messages.”);
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986) (“Since this Court last had occasion to consider the
infliction of the death penalty upon the insane, our interpretations of the Due Process Clause and the
Eighth Amendment have evolved substantially.”).
306. See supra section I.G.
307. See BARBER & FLEMING, supra note 221, at 97 (noting that under the New Originalism,
“construction” does the work that “interpretation” does under the authors’ constitutional theory).
308. See id. (“The terms ‘construction’ and ‘interpretation’ are freely used as synonyms for each
other in The Federalist and throughout constitutional history and commentary before Whittington.”).
309. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
310. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, An Anatomy of False Analysis: Original Intent, 1994 BYU L. REV. 715,
721 (agreeing with Richard Epstein that Blaisdell “‘contains some of the most misguided thinking on
Constitutional interpretation imaginable’”); Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: A Comment on Professor Lessig’s Theory of Translation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1449 n.53
(1997) (arguing that Blaisdell cannot be defended on originalist grounds).
311. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts . . . .”).
312. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 25, at 677–78, 678 n.112; Lund, supra note 176, at 1369–70.
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the Congress, or permit the election of President by a general popular vote
without regard to the number of electors to which the States are respectively
entitled, or permit the States to “coin money” or to “make anything but gold
and silver coin a tender in payment of debts.” But, where constitutional grants
and limitations of power are set forth in general clauses, which afford a broad
outline, the process of construction is essential to fill in the details.313

The Court went on to examine the framing history and underlying principles
of the Contracts Clause, but made clear that “full recognition of the occasion
and general purpose of the clause does not suffice to fix its precise scope.”314
The Court ultimately reached a conclusion that it believed, in New Originalist
fashion, to be the most consistent with the language and underlying purposes of
the Clause as applied to modern circumstances (here, one must substitute the
word “construction” for the word “interpretation,” and one must be aware of the
different uses of the term “meaning,” in order to translate the passage):
It is no answer to say that this public need was not apprehended a century
ago, or to insist that what the provision of the Constitution meant to the vision
of that day it must mean to the vision of our time. If by the statement that
what the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it means to-day, it is
intended to say that the great clauses of the Constitution must be confined to
the interpretation [read: construction] which the [F]ramers, with the conditions and outlook of their time, would have placed upon them, the statement
carries its own refutation. It was to guard against such a narrow conception
that Chief Justice Marshall uttered the memorable warning: “We must never
forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding”; “a constitution intended to
endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises
of human affairs.”315

This passage rejects the proposition that the Constitution’s “meaning” should
be understood in the narrow sense of its scope or mandate, endorsing instead the
view that the Constitution’s “meaning” is broader and more abstract. Responding to Justice Sutherland’s dissent, which sounded in the rhetoric of the Old
Originalism,316 the Court—again in New Originalist fashion—recognized the
“fine distinction between the intended meaning of the words of the Constitution
and their intended application,” though it ultimately found no need to rely on
that distinction in the instant case because there was “no warrant” for believing
313. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 426.
314. Id. at 428.
315. Id. at 442–43 (citation omitted) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407,
415 (1819)).
316. See id. at 448–53 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). Justice Sutherland’s dissent nicely illustrates that
the terms “interpretation” and “construction” have not traditionally been distinguished in constitutional
law. See id. at 453 (“The whole aim of construction, as applied to a provision of the Constitution, is to
discover the meaning, to ascertain and give effect to the intent of its framers and the people who
adopted it.”).
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that the Framers “would have interpreted the clause differently had they had
occasion to assume that responsibility in the conditions of the later day.”317
When its apparent methodological compatibility with the New Originalism is
recognized, Blaisdell might serve as an illustration of the inability of the New
Originalism to constrain judges or obviate outcomes despised by many champions of originalism.
V. ORIGINALIST RESPONSES
How have originalists dealt with originalism achieving theoretical sophistication only by sacrificing the promise that made it appealing in the first place?
For some New Originalists, this truth is not especially troublesome. Many of
the most prolific New Originalists—and the ones who have pushed the theory
the furthest in the directions outlined above—have never been particularly
interested in judicial constraint. They were drawn to originalism by its theoretical attractiveness, not by the results that it promised. Indeed, some of them are
more than happy to see judges use originalism to liberal or libertarian ends.318
To them, the flexibility that comes from higher levels of generality “is not a
bug” of originalism; rather, “[i]t’s a feature.”319 Some of these theorists were, in
fact, once nonoriginalists.320 It was only when originalism began to move in the
New direction that they came to embrace it. It was the theoretical appeal that
brought them on board, and they shed no tears for the constraint that was
sacrificed along the way.
But most originalists who have endorsed the New Originalism to any degree
are not willing to admit its consequences. They continue to insist that originalism is meaningfully constraining—to make the promise of constraint321—
because to do otherwise would undermine their entire constitutional worldview
and the very mission of their theory. “The core of originalism,” they insist, “is
the proposition that text and history impose meaningful, binding constraints on
interpretive discretion.”322 Thus, they are highly skeptical of some of the more
progressive New Originalists and their open insistence on the flexibility of

317. Id. at 443 (majority opinion).
318. See, e.g., RANDY BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW passim
(1998) (outlining a philosophy of libertarianism); Barnett, supra note 170, at 405 (noting that Jack
Balkin is a “progressive constitutional theorist[]”); Perry, supra note 57, at 86 (describing himself as
“an unapologetic and unreconstructed” “constitutional progressive”); Smith, supra note 5, at 11 (noting
that “Balkin sacrifices little or nothing by the conversion” to originalism).
319. Barnett, supra note 70, at 23; see also Barnett, supra note 2, at 645 (arguing that the “lack of
determinacy” that comes from high levels of abstraction is “one of the well-known virtues of this
particular writing”).
320. See Barnett, supra note 170, at 405 (stating that “[he] considered [him]self a nonoriginalist”
and noting that Jack Balkin was once a nonoriginalist); Farber, supra note 52, at 1086 (describing
Michael Perry as “a leading non-originalist”).
321. See supra notes 227–42 and accompanying text.
322. Lund, supra note 176, at 1372.
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originalism.323 They insist that the New Originalism has achieved theoretical
sophistication and defensibility without having sacrificed its potential for meaningful constraint.
Their efforts to deny the sacrifice have taken four forms: (1) the adoption of
theories of constitutional construction that deny a role for judges in choosing
among the various outcomes that are consistent with the open-ended original
meaning; (2) a refusal to go along with (or a failure to acknowledge) some of
the flexibility-creating New Originalist theoretical moves; (3) a failure to follow
through in practice on a commitment in theory to some of the New Originalist
moves; and (4) an insistence that the original, objective public meaning of the
major constitutional rights provisions is actually remarkably narrow.
None of these strategies succeeds.
A. ARTICULATING NARROW THEORIES OF CONSTRUCTION

Some New Originalists have sought to avoid the nonconstraining implications of the New Originalism by advocating theories of constitutional construction that disavow judicial discretion. They recognize that the constitutional
rights provisions are drafted in broad terms capable of supporting many different outcomes, but they insist that so long as a law or governmental action is
consistent with the open-ended original meaning—so long as it falls within the
broad range of supportable outcomes—judges must sustain it. Constitutional
construction is a job for the political branches, not the courts. Keith Whittington, for instance, argues that where the original public meaning is broad enough
to accommodate competing outcomes, “historically inherited restraints on current majorities do not exist.”324 As such, it is the political branches who should
determine “how constitutional meaning is shaped so as to accommodate contemporary political needs and desires.”325 Constitutional “construction alleviates
the pressure on the [J]udiciary to provide and account for all the flexibility that
might exist in the Constitution.”326
This is a viable political theory. But by definition under the New Originalist
lexicon, it is not an effort at constitutional interpretation; it is instead a decision
about what to do when the Constitution, fairly interpreted, does not yield an

323. See Smith, supra note 5, at 14 (“Old-time originalists might naturally be suspicious of the
announced conversions of dubious characters like Balkin (and Randy Barnett, and Michael Perry), and
they might try to exclude these would-be converts from the fold . . . .”); sources cited supra note 206.
324. WHITTINGTON, supra note 44, at 206.
325. Id. at 205.
326. Id. at 204. Other originalists have made essentially the same point without embracing the
language of “constitutional construction.” See, e.g., Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 26, at 1129 n.54
(arguing that where “there is a range of indeterminacy, even applying correct interpretive methods. . . .
there is no basis for the courts to invalidate the political branches’ choice” (citation omitted)); Paulsen,
supra note 100, at 2057–58 (admitting that the “interesting and difficult cases concern the periphery,”
but arguing that because in such cases the Constitution is “actually indeterminate (or underdeterminate) as to the specific question at hand,” the “court has no basis for displacing the rule supplied
by” a democratically enacted statute).
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answer.327 As such, it is a political choice, not a course of action mandated by a
commitment to original public meaning. Judges could just as easily, and just as
consistently with the original meaning of the Constitution, choose other theories
of construction—some of which contemplate a much greater role for the
Judiciary.328 Thus, the essential truth remains: The New Originalism allows
judges to choose discretion-limiting theories of construction, but it also allows
them to choose discretion-granting theories. It does not constrain them.
One could no doubt articulate structural arguments in service of a claim that
this narrow theory of construction actually is mandated by the Constitution—
arguments emphasizing the unelected nature of the Judiciary.329 But because
those arguments would not depend upon the meaning of the constitutional text
(which is silent on the issue), they would not sound squarely in the New
Originalism.330 Nor would they be particularly good historical arguments,
insofar as there is strong evidence that the Framers understood the Constitution
to contemplate a substantial role for the courts in resolving constitutional
indeterminacy.331
B. DECLINING TO ENDORSE THE FULL NEW ORIGINALIST PACKAGE

A second way in which some originalists have arguably mitigated the consequences of theoretical evolution is by stopping short of endorsing the full New
Originalist theoretical package. That is to say, some originalists have accepted
some of the New Originalist theoretical moves, but not others (sometimes

327. See supra section I.G.
328. Randy Barnett would adopt a “Presumption of Liberty” that would empower an active
Judiciary. See Barnett, supra note 26, at 264–65. Jack Balkin would adopt “living constitutionalism” as
his preferred theory of construction—thus reconciling originalism with its archnemesis. See Balkin,
supra note 71, at 559–60.
329. Cf. Calabresi, supra note 46, at 1091–94 (rejecting Barnett’s presumption of liberty construction because its active role for the Judiciary seems inconsistent with the overall constitutional
structure); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST.
COMMENT. 289, 296 n.18 (2005) (declaring that “a decision invalidating political action where the
constitutional text is vague or ambiguous (in the sense of failing to yield a determinate rule of
law) . . . is incorrect on originalist grounds” and “corrupts the interpretive theory of originalism”). Lynn
Baker notes that these arguments tend to be undertheorized—relying merely on abstract notions of
“majoritarianism.” See Lynn A. Baker, Constitutional Ambiguities and Originalism: Lessons from the
Spending Power, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 495, 496, 499–503 (2009).
330. The potential exception here is Michael Stokes Paulsen, who has recently argued that “the
Constitution’s text itself suggests . . . a default rule of interpretation where the constitutional text is
unspecific: popular republican self-government.” See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution
Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 881–82 (2009).
331. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 229 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“All new
laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill and passed on the fullest and most mature
deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated
and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.”); Peter J. Smith, The Marshall
Court and the Originalist’s Dilemma, 90 MINN. L. REV. 612, 624 (2006) (arguing that “the ratification
debates suggest something of a consensus (at least between the warring Federalist and Anti-Federalist
camps) that case-by-case adjudication in the courts would play a central role in assigning fixed
constitutional meaning when the text of the Constitution was ambiguous”).
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explicitly rejecting them, more often simply not acknowledging or engaging
them). Justice Scalia, for instance, has championed the move from original
intent to original meaning,332 but has not said much about most of the other
New Originalist moves. Justice Thomas is even further behind; he has not even
consistently or explicitly acknowledged that the proper search is for the original
public meaning rather than the original intent of the Framers.333 Other originalists have endorsed original meaning, but seemingly continue to favor original
expected application.334 And still others have endorsed original meaning, and
rejected original intent and original expected application, but have not yet
bought into the notion that the proper search is for the objective understandings
of a hypothetical observer; these originalists continue to search for the actual
understandings of the actual ratifiers or public.335
These intermediate approaches can allow an originalist to find (or at least
claim to find) a historically determined meaning at a narrower level of generality than the text would objectively dictate, which can then be used to place
greater constraints on judicial discretion.336 But these approaches do not mitigate the originalists’ quandary so much as they exemplify it. The New Originalist moves strengthen originalism and make it a more viable and defensible
theory.337 The fewer of these moves that an originalist accepts, the less theoretically sound her theory.338 The more she refuses to sacrifice constraint, the less
she can claim sophistication.
C. FAILING TO WALK THE WALK

Sometimes, originalists will accept the New Originalist moves in theory, but
then turn around and not actually employ them in practice. Justice Scalia, for
332. See supra notes 210–12 and accompanying text.
333. See Colby & Smith, supra note 24, at 300–02 (noting that Justice Thomas “seems not to
contemplate any distinction among original intent, original understanding, and original textual meaning”); cf. Gregory E. Maggs, Which Original Meaning of the Constitution Matters to Justice Thomas?,
4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 494, 511–14 (2009) (hypothesizing that Justice Thomas seeks the “general
original meaning” of the Constitution by searching for agreement among sources of original intent,
original understanding, and original objective meaning).
334. See John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the Core of
Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 378–81 (2007) (arguing in favor of giving heavy weight to
original expected application).
335. See, e.g., Lash, supra note 45, at 338–40; McConnell, supra note 75, at 1280.
336. See, e.g., supra note 280 and accompanying text (discussing equal protection).
337. See supra Part II.
338. In a provocative recent article, John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport refuse to accept the
distinction between interpretation and construction, arguing that even seemingly vague and ambiguous
constitutional provisions can nonetheless be “interpreted” to produce proper narrow outcomes by
employing settled interpretive methods that were in place at the time of the framing—methods that will
dictate narrow answers to specific questions. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 136, at 751–54.
This is a bold assertion given the profoundly open-ended nature of much of the constitutional text, and
McGinnis and Rappaport still have much work to do to back it up. Indeed, Caleb Nelson has found that
there was no agreement among the framing generation as to the proper interpretive conventions. See
Nelson, supra note 170, at 560–78; see also Cornell, supra note 172, at 1101 (arguing that “the
Founders disagreed over the proper methodology for reading constitutional texts”).
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instance, has claimed to reject original expected application. He insists that an
originalist owes fidelity to “what the text would reasonably be understood to
mean,” not the “concrete expectations of the lawgivers.”339 But in practice, he
often employs the very expectations jurisprudence that he claims to have
disavowed.340 The same can perhaps be said of Steven Calabresi, who has
insisted that “[w]hat judges must be faithful to is the enacted law, not the
expectations of the parties who wrote the law,”341 but who has criticized Randy
Barnett for reading the broad language of the Constitution in a way that
contravenes the narrow expectations of the Framers.342
The consequences of the New Originalism cannot be avoided with smoke and
mirrors. Originalists cannot have it both ways, simultaneously articulating a
theory that sounds sophisticated while applying a theory that is constraining
only by abandoning that sophistication.
D. DENYING THE (SEEMINGLY) OBVIOUS

Finally, some originalists seek to avoid the consequences of the New Originalism by insisting that the objective, original public meaning of the Constitution’s
major rights clauses is much less abstract than this Article has suggested. Thus,
they argue, constitutional interpretation is substantially more determinate (and
therefore constitutional construction is markedly more constrained) than one
might think.343 If this claim were true, then it would indeed negate the sacrifice—it would make the New Originalism both theoretically sophisticated and
functionally constraining.344 But originalists have done little to inspire confidence in it.
Although various originalists have made this claim with regard to just about
every constitutional right,345 the brief discussion here will focus on the recent
work of Steven Calabresi, as he is the long-time originalist who has most
339. Scalia, supra note 212, at 144.
340. For detailed substantiation of this point, see Balkin, supra note 82, at 295–97; Berman, supra
note 100, at 386 & n.21; Thomas B. Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Justice Scalia, the
Ten Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1132–38
(2006); Colby & Smith, supra note 24, at 296–97; Green, supra note 87, at 556–58; Greenberg &
Litman, supra note 99, at 574–82; Koppelman, supra note 97, at 733–40.
341. Calabresi & Fine, supra note 70, at 669.
342. See Calabresi, supra note 46, at 1085 (“There is simply no way to argue that the [F]ramers of
the Fourteenth Amendment would have understood sodomy or abortion as a privilege or immunity. Nor
would the [F]ramers of the Ninth Amendment have understood the rights retained by the people as
including a right to engage in sodomy or to have an abortion.”).
343. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 604–05 (2008) (“Justice Stevens’ view
thus relies on the proposition . . . that different people of the founding period had vastly different
conceptions of the right to keep and bear arms. That simply does not comport with our longstanding
view that the Bill of Rights codified venerable, widely understood liberties.”).
344. With one significant exception: the dead-hand objection would retake center stage, and for
many people, would eliminate any claim to theoretical legitimacy.
345. See, e.g., Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 95 n.1 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(claiming that the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause is unambiguous and clearly forbids
segregation); Paulsen, supra note 100, at 2047–48 (insisting on a clear textual meaning of the Ninth
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directly engaged the cutting edge of the New Originalism.346 For the most part,
Calabresi accepts the New Originalist methodology, but he insists that as a
matter of original, objective public meaning, provisions like “the Privileges or
Immunities, Equal Protection, and Due Process Clauses all have very determinate content.”347
Consider first the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Judge Bork famously
dubbed this a provision “whose meaning is largely unknown” and “cannot be
ascertained.”348 But Calabresi (along with co-author Livia Fine) reaches the
rather remarkable conclusion that, “[i]n its own way, the Privileges or Immunities Clause is as specific in meaning as the requirement that the President be at
least thirty-five years old.”349 Its words—“[n]o State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States”350—somehow plainly mean that all citizens must enjoy the same fundamental and common law rights as white citizens enjoyed at the time of its
enactment.351 Thus, it is actually very determinate, and it justifies (ever so
conveniently) many of the modern Supreme Court’s most universally celebrated
decisions, including Loving v. Virginia.352 Calabresi writes:
Did one white citizen enjoy a common law or fundamental right to marry
another white citizen of the opposite sex in 1868? Of course he or she did. . . .
If a white citizen has a right to marry another white citizen then an African
American must enjoy “the same right.” . . . The text compels this answer.353

Really? One could just as easily rephrase the inquiry: “Did one white citizen
enjoy a common law or fundamental right to marry a person of another race? Of
course she didn’t. If a white person does not have a right to marry a person of
another race then an African American does not enjoy that same right either.
The text compels this answer.” Why is that reasoning any more or less compelled by the text than Calabresi’s? The result in Loving was indeed compelled
by many things—morality, equality, precedent—but the plain, objective, unambiguous meaning of the text of the Privileges or Immunities Clause (which
nowhere even mentions race, marriage, or equality, and which was not relied
upon by the Loving Court) is not one of them. That result is permitted by the
open-ended objective meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause (or the

Amendment and declaring that a view of that Amendment as allowing judges to protect unenumerated
rights “is simply not textually defensible”).
346. See Calabresi, supra note 46, passim (challenging Randy Barnett’s understanding of originalism); Calabresi & Fine, supra note 70 (suggesting refinements to Jack Balkin’s theory of originalism).
347. Calabresi & Fine, supra note 70, at 665 (footnotes omitted).
348. BORK, supra note 15, at 39, 166.
349. Calabresi & Fine, supra note 70, at 694–95.
350. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
351. See Calabresi & Fine, supra note 70, at 694–95.
352. 388 U.S. 1, 8, 12 (1967) (striking down a ban on interracial marriage).
353. Calabresi & Fine, supra note 70, at 670 (footnote omitted).
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Equal Protection Clause, or the Due Process Clause), but it is hardly compelled
by it. Calabresi’s insistence that the deeply capacious language of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause is capable of only one narrow, determinate meaning is
simply not plausible. If proof is needed for that assertion, consider that at the
end of the sentence implausibly declaring that this Clause has a meaning as
specific as the presidential age limitation, Calabresi drops a footnote with a “but
see” citation to a recent originalist law review article that posits a very different
(and much broader) original meaning of that same clause. The author of that
article? Steven Calabresi.354
The same basic point can be made about Calabresi’s discussion of the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses. Calabresi insists that the plain, objective
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause is simply that the states must enforce
their generally applicable, neutrally written laws in a way that does not discriminate against classes of citizens; contrary to over a century of conventional
wisdom, the Clause does not forbid the making of unequal laws.355 For this
proposition, Calabresi cites the work of John Harrison.356 Harrison, however,
was much more modest in his conclusions, admitting that the task of interpreting the Equal Protection Clause “is not easy,” and offering his reading only as
the “best” one—as “probably” correct—not as clearly and unambiguously
correct.357
Similarly, Calabresi rejects the “oxymoron” of substantive due process with
the ipse dixit that the Due Process Clauses “simply have no application to
legislative deprivation, and they are not at all vague or open-ended on this
point.”358 But even John Harrison, Calabresi’s sole source for the meaning of

354. The article was cowritten with Sarah Agudo. See id. at 695 n.160 (citing Steven G. Calabresi &
Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions When the Fourteenth Amendment Was
Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV.
7, 88 (2008) (providing evidence that the Privileges or Immunities Clause may have constitutionalized
broad protection for natural and inalienable rights)). In addition, numerous originalist scholars have
recently proposed still other original meanings of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. See, e.g., Philip
Hamburger, Privileges or Immunities, 105 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (arguing that the original
meaning of the Clause was to guarantee Comity Clause rights to free blacks); Kurt T. Lash, The Origins
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part II: John Bingham and the Second Draft of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J. 329 (2011) (providing evidence that the Clause’s author understood it to
incorporate only enumerated rights against the states); Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense of
“Of” in the Privileges or Immunities Clause 87–114 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id⫽1658010 (presenting evidence of original meaning suggesting that the Clause
is, at least in part, an equal citizenship guarantee); cf. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020,
3089 & n.2 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the lack of consensus among legal scholars as to the
original meaning of the Clause); Lawrence Rosenthal, The New Originalism Meets the Fourteenth
Amendment: Original Public Meaning and the Problem of Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
361, 365–400 (2009) (arguing that historical argument cannot establish a single original public meaning
of the Clause).
355. See Calabresi & Fine, supra note 70, at 695.
356. See id. (citing John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE
L.J. 1385 (1992)).
357. Harrison, supra note 356, at 1448, 1450.
358. Calabresi & Fine, supra note 70, at 692.
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the Equal Protection Clause, has concluded that that there is a powerful
originalist case to be made for the proposition that the substantive due process
doctrine is consistent with the original meaning of the Due Process Clauses—a
case that other originalists have carefully and thoughtfully made.359
This is not the place to attempt to conclusively establish the meaning of these
various clauses. The point here is simply that it is highly implausible that, even
after careful historical investigation, one could confidently tease such narrow
“objective” meanings from the text, taken at the level of generality naturally
suggested by its broad words.360 Even the Old Originalists recognized this
fact—which is why they insisted on a jurisprudence of narrow original intent
and expectations. In Raoul Berger’s words:
Resort to original intention is required if only because some words in the
Constitution are susceptible of an enormous range of meaning. One has only
to think of equal protection, for example. It means so much that one commentator says it means nothing. Unless limited by the original intention, those
words serve as a crystal ball from which a judge, like a soothsayer, can draw
forth anything he wants.361

The reality of the New Originalism cannot be defeated by wishfully turning a
blind eye to the generality of the very text by which originalists claim to be
bound.
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to highlight an unheralded and ironic consequence of
the emergence of the New Originalism. Whereas the Old Originalism promised
constraint but lacked respectability, the New Originalism has achieved respectability, but only by sacrificing constraint. It is not possible for an originalist
theory to have both at the same time.
This phenomenon is not just bedeviling; in practice, there is something illicit
about it. The Old Originalism arose simultaneously in both the academy and the
broader public discourse. At the same time that originalist scholars and judges
were first articulating their theory in monographs and judicial opinions, originalism “emerged as a new and powerful kind of constitutional politics in which
claims about the sole legitimate method of interpreting the Constitution inspired
conservative mobilization in both electoral politics and in the legal profession.”362 Scholarly originalists claimed fidelity to original intent as a means of
constraining “activist” judges, and the conservative political movement quickly
jumped on board. Originalism was both an academic theory and popular rallying cry.

359.
360.
361.
362.

See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 105–11 (discussing the open-ended nature of many constitutional provisions).
Berger, supra note 84, at 351.
Post & Siegel, supra note 21, at 548.
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But the political and the intellectual histories of originalism have diverged.363
The academic portrait of a jurisprudence of original intent capable of purging
judicial subjectivity from the process of constitutional adjudication was quickly
demolished in law reviews. Yet, that ivory tower criticism has generally not
penetrated the popular consciousness. The Old Originalism was murdered, but it
will not die.364 Mitchell Berman argues that originalism is “pernicious because
of its tendency to be deployed in the public square—on the campaign trail, on
talk radio, in Senate confirmation hearings, even in Supreme Court opinions—to bolster the popular fable that constitutional adjudication can be practiced in something close to an objective and mechanical fashion.”365
If anything, Berman understates the perniciousness. Originalism is generally
no longer deployed in this way in the academy—by those who actually define
and defend it intellectually—but it continues to be deployed in this way in the
public arena.366 In the academic world, originalism has evolved into a theory
that affords significant discretion to judges. But in the public arena, it is still
portrayed by the likes of Rush Limbaugh as a panacea for judicial activism:
The only antidote to this kind of judicial activism is the conservative
judicial philosophy known as Originalism. As Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas explained in a February 2001 speech to the American Enterprise
Institute: “The Constitution means what the delegates of the Philadelphia
Convention and of the state ratifying conventions understood it to mean; not
what we judges think it should mean.” Hallelujah.
Originalism means not molding the Constitution to fit your political and
social beliefs. It means not citing foreign law to support your preferences. It
means not imposing your personal policy whims on society via judicial
fiat.367

363. Cf. Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily, & Stephen Ansolabehere, Profiling Originalism 3 (Dec. 2,
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Intellectual_Life/
Persily.Yale.pdf (“[I]t is not clear that frequent invocations of the founding fathers or original intent on
cable news, on talk radio, or even at Supreme Court confirmation hearings has much at all to do with
the serious work of historians and legal scholars.”).
364. Cf. Smith, supra note 48, at 161 (“The deeper reason that Originalism will not die, I think, is
that it has staked out the moral high ground, championing the objectivity of interpretation that is
essential to the ideal of the rule of law.”).
365. Berman, supra note 163, at 8.
366. Cf. Greene, supra note 192, at 10 (noting that the distinction between interpretation and
construction is “fastidiously maintained in academic literature but generally unexpressed in judicial
opinions or public discourse”); Greene, supra note 25, at 662 (noting that “the political rhetoric
associated with originalism does not distinguish between” original intent and original meaning); Todd
E. Pettys, The Myth of the Written Constitution, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 991, 1011 (2009) (discussing
the distinction between interpretation and construction and noting that even though “originalism has
grown continually more sophisticated in scholarly circles . . . [it] certainly does not mean that popular
conceptions have kept pace”).
367. Limbaugh Fundamentals: What Is Originalism?, RUSHLIMBAUGH.COM, http://www.rushlimbaugh.
com/home/menu/limfunoriginalism.guest.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2010).
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Originalism seems to be having its cake and eating it too. It is both a
respectable academic theory and a popularly celebrated antidote for judicial
activism, even though it is impossible for an originalist theory to be both.
Originalism is cheating. It is overcoming its sacrifice by ignoring it.368

368. Efforts to bring the sacrifice to the attention of the public will likely prove difficult. See Greene,
Persily, & Ansolabehere, supra note 363, at 33 (noting that surveys of the public show that endorsement
of originalism correlates closely with opposition to Roe v. Wade, and suggesting that “a kind of
cognitive dissonance may hinder efforts to sever the link between methodology and result,” and thus,
“[s]cholars like Jack Balkin who have tried to advance an originalist argument for abortion rights may
be fruitlessly inserting a legal argument into the culture wars”).

